Jessen v. Peterson, Nelson & Co.
Before: Lennon
Synopsis
Findings—Duty of Court—Material Issues—Ultimate Fact—Probative Facts.—It is the duty of the trial court to find upon all of the material issues raised by the pleadings; and ordinarily it is necessary to the validity and sufficiency of findings that such court should find the ultimate fact in issue, or such probative facts as will enable the court to declare that the ultimate fact necessarily results therefrom. Where probative facts are found from which the existence of the ultimate fact may. be conclusively inferred, the finding is sufficient, and a judgment based thereon will be sustained.
Id.—Action for Damages for Personal Injuries—Findings upon Material Issues—Ultimate Finding in Conclusions of Law.— Where, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, the court found for the plaintiff upon all of the material issues, and made an ultimate finding as to the total amount of damages sustained, in its conclusions of law, and rendered judgment therefor, the trial court’s declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment therefor as the result of the damage inflicted by defendant was in effect a finding of the ultimate fact that plaintiff had been damaged to that amount.
Id.—Construction of Findings—Position Immaterial—Support of Judgment.—The mere presence of the ultimate finding as to the amount of damages in the conclusions of law, rather than in the findings of fact, where it belonged, did not detract from or destroy its efficacy as a finding of fact; and so construed and read in conjunction with the preceding probative facts found by the court, it is sufficient to support the judgment upon the issue of damages.
Id.—Cause of Plaintiff’s Injuries—Negligent Driving of Defendant’s Horse and Buggy—Support of Finding as to Ownership and Control—Proof of Liability.—Where the alleged cause of plaintiff’s injuries was the negligent driving of defendant’s horse and buggy, and it was an admitted fact that the horse and buggy belonged to the defendant corporation, and that the driver was its vice-president and general superintendent of its work, “who had the right to operate the buggy” in the performance of its work, a finding of defendant’s ownership of the horse and buggy, and that it was “wholly in the possession and control of the defendant at the time of the injury,” was sufficiently sustained; and that the injury was the result of the negligence of such driver is all that need be shown to charge defendant' with liability.
Id.—Accepted Bule as to Negligence of Employee Intrusted With Charge of Vehicle.—It is the accepted rule that, where an employee is intrusted with the possession and operation of a vehicle, with permission to use it, in his discretion, in the business of the employer, the latter will be held responsible in damages for injuries inflicted upon the person of another resulting from the negligence of the employee in the use and operation of the vehicle; and, in such a case, it is not necessary for the person seeking damages to prove that, at the time of the injuries, the employee was engaged in executing any particular business or specific command of his principal.
LENNON, P. J.
In this action the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $1,000, as damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligent and reckless driving of a horse and vehicle owned
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by the defendant and which, at the time of the accident, was being used in the business of the defendant and under the control of one of its agents.
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged damages to her as the result of the accident, aggregating the sum of $2,310. Of this amount $2,000 was claimed for injuries to plaintiff’s person and $310 was alleged to have been expended by her for nursing, medicines and surgical attendance.
The answer of the defendant specifically denied the existence of the damages pleaded, and upon the issue thus raised the trial court found for the plaintiff to the extent of $122.50 for money expended in medical attendance, but omitted in its findings of fact to designate the specific amount in which the plaintiff was damaged on account of personal injuries. The court did find however:
“1. That the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of this action, was a
feme sole;
that since the said action was commenced plaintiff married. . . .
“3. That on the twelfth day of October, 1907, a horse and buggy owned by the defendant corporation, and wholly in the possession and under the control of said defendant corporation, was being driven along, over and upon Market street, a public highway and street in the city and county of San Francisco, and when at or near the junction of the following named public streets in the city and county of San Francisco, to wit, Jones, Market and McAllister streets, the defendant corporation handled, managed and drove said horse and buggy in such a careless, negligent, reckless and fast manner as to cause the defendant’s buggy to strike the plaintiff and violently throw her to the ground and thereafter drag her for some distance, thereby bruising her body and breaking her right leg.”
With the exception of the omission heretofore noted the trial court found specifically in favor of - the plaintiff upon every material issue in the case, and from the findings as a whole deduced the single conclusion of law “that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,000.”
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