Albertson v. MacFarlane

STURTEVANT, J.

On December 31, 1917, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court, asking that the trial court adjudge him to be the owner of, and that the defendant was holding, a certain piece of property in Alameda County as trustee for the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer in which he denied the allegations stated in the complaint, and as a second defense, he pleaded a certain judgment in bar, and he also filed an amendment to his answer in which he set forth the statute of limitations.- A trial was had, in which all the issues so made by the pleadings were fully tried out. In other words, the judgment of the trial court did not turn solely on the statute of limitations, nor solely on the plea of a judgment

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in bar, but rested on all of the issues. The judgment of the trial court was in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed, and has appeared in person during a part of the proceedings, and latterly Sawyer & Sawyer, attorneys at law, did, as a matter of charity, prepare and present to this court a brief on behalf of the appellant. The appellant’s brief makes four separate points: (1) that

appellant is the owner of the land; (2) that the deed to MacFarlane is a mortgage; (3) that it has never been foreclosed; and (4) that the prior judgment was made and entered against the appellant at a time when he was actually-insane and actually an inmate of a state hospital and, therefore, is not a bar. The respondent, in reply, makes three separate points: (1) That all the material allegations in the complaint were tried out by the trial court, that the evidence perchance may be said to be conflicting, but that all of the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint were found against the plaintiff, and that such findings are conclusive on this court; (2) that the question of title to the lands in dispute was tried out in a former action between the same parties, and that the judgment in the former case is a bar; and (3) that the plaintiff’s cause of action, if any he has, is barred by the statute of limitations. Among other things, the court found that on, and long prior to, the sixth day of February, 1913, plaintiff was the owner in fee of the lands described in plaintiff’s complaint; that on February 6, 1913, plaintiff sold said lands to the defendant, who has ever since been in possession thereof, claiming to own the same-; that the deed of conveyance was absolute in form, and was not intended to be a mortgage, nor to be a conveyance in trust. That prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiff never demanded of defendant an accounting, nor did he ever tender to the defendant $1,240, together with interest thereon from the sixth day of February¡ 1913. That on the sixth day of February, 1913, and at the time of the trial, the property in dispute was of the value of $1,500, and no more. That subsequent to the execution of the deed dated February 6, 1913, the defendant gave to the plaintiff an option to purchase said property on or before the sixth day of April, 3913, and the plaintiff never exercised said option. That on May 27, 1913, plaintiff made a deed, absolute in form,