City of Oakland v. Industrial Accident Commission

THE COURT.

The application of the city of Oakland, a municipal corporation, for a writ of review herein sets forth that one H. F. Norton had heretofore presented a petition before the Industrial Accident Commission for the adjustment of his claim against the petitioner herein arising out of an accident alleged to have occurred while in the employ of the petitioner on the fourteenth day of August, 1916. Upon the hearing before the said commission the evidence showed that the city of Oakland has established and maintained a municipal woodyard under an ordinance of said city, the terms of which ordinance, however, were not presented in evidence; that the nature" of the applicant’s employment was that of a teamster, whose general duties were those of delivering .wood, hauling garbage, and performing such other services as might lawfully be required qf him by the superintendent thereof within the scope and purposes and object of the institution. That on the eighteenth day of August, 1916, the" said applicant, as such teamster, was instructed by the superintendent to deliver a load of wood to a certain address, and after so doing to proceed with his team to the dwelling of an indigent family for the purpose of moving its household goods. While so proceeding to the fulfillment of this latter instruction the applicant’s team and wagon came in collision

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with an electric car on the streets of the city of Oakland, whereby he was thrown from his wagon and injured.-

The Industrial Accident Commission made an award in his favor and against the petitioner herein, and upon this proceeding the petitioner contends that said, award was beyond the authority and jurisdiction of the commission, for the reason that the evidence and findings of the commission showed affirmatively that at the time said applicant received his. said injuries he was not engaged in the performance of any service growing out of or incidental to his employment as a teamster for the said municipal woodyard of this petitioner, nor was he acting within the scope of the purposes for which said woodyard was created.

In support of this contention the petitioner herein urged upon the hearing that upon the face of the findings of fact made by said commission it was entitled to the issuance of this writ, for the reason that the findings affirmatively show that the purpose for which said municipal woodyard was established and maintained was that of giving indigent unemployed persons board and lodging in return for labor in said woodyard, and that it was,beyond the scope of the purposes of said institution and of the.powers of its superintendent to direct the applicant to move an indigent family not in any way connected with said woodyard, and hence that in the performance of' such service the said applicant was outside the scope of his employment.