Howson v. Board of Medical Examiners

STROTHER, J.,

pro

tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment affirming on review an order of the Board of Medical Examiners by which the petitioner was suspended from practice in this state as a physician and surgeon for “unprofessional conduct”.

The accusation presented to the board was in two counts, the first alleging the violation of subdivision seventh (a) of section 14 of the Medical Practice Act, and the second charging a violation of subdivision eighth of the same section.

The act specifies minutely the training which a person shall have in various systems of treating human infirmities ■ in order to entitle him to a license to practice. Section 14 provides the procedure for the trial of licensees on charges of “unprofessional conduct”, and defines with particularity what acts shall constitute such conduct. One such act is described in subdivision seventh (a) as “employing directly or indirectly any suspended or unlicensed practitioner in the

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practice of any system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted, or the aiding or abetting any unlicensed person to practice any system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted”. Subdivision eighth denounces the use by the licensee of any other name than his own in his practice.

The first question appellant raises is of the constitutionality of the act. He contends that it is an attempt to unlawfully delegate to a judicial body the legislative power to create and define crimes, and cites decisions of the courts of this state as authority for his contention. The decisions referred to were not in construction of this act, and have no application to its provisions. The definition in the act is so all-embracing that there is no need for construction in order to bring any particular set of facts within its terms. Every person of common knowledge knows what “treating the sick or afflicted”, means. The doing of any act, in accordance with “any system or mode” of treatment, would be within the terms of the definition.

It is claimed by the appellant that the charges in form, as set out in the accusation, were not sufficient to state an offense. The statement of the charges was in the language of the statute, which has been held to be sufficient in the recent case of