White v. Mitchell
Before: Burnett
Synopsis
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Yolo County, denying a writ of mandate. N. A. Hawkins, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
BURNETT, J.
The board of trustees of the city of Woodland approved a claim and ordered a warrant drawn in favor of appellant for fifteen days’ service as a member of the board of equalization of said city at five dollars per day, and respondent refused to issue the warrant, claiming that under an ordinance of said city the work of equalization must be completed within the limit of two weeks. Application was made to the superior court of Yolo county for a writ of mandate to compel respondent to draw said warrant. The -appeal is from the order denying the writ.
The basis for appellant’s contention is found in section 774 of the. general municipal corporation act (Deering's Gen. Laws [1908], p. 881), and an ordinance of the said city of Woodland adopted in 1907 fixing the compensation of the members of the board of equalization. The former provides
[204]
that the board “shall continue in session from day to day until all of the returns of the assessor have been rectified,” and the latter, that each member “while in actual attendance upon the meetings of the board of equalization” shall receive “the sum of $5 per day.” Since appellant was in actual attendance as a member of said board for fifteen days, it is admitted that he would be entitled to the writ were it not for an ordinance in force adopted by the board of trustees in 1890 providing “that said meetings may be held from time to time, as in such notice specified, for the period of two weeks, if necessary, and no longer.”
While the legislature in the said municipal corporation act provided for cities of the fourth class that the “sessions of the board shall be held from time to time, as in its notice specified, for the period of two weeks, and no longer,” there is no such limitation prescribed as to cities of the fifth and the sixth class. The direction as to these, already noted, is that the board "shall remain in session until all the returns are rectified, hut that necessarily implies that the sessions should continue only so long as is necessary to accomplish this purpose. It was certainly not intended that this work should be indefinitely prolonged and thereby the city be put to unnecessary expense. In the absence of any other legislation on the subject, the board of equalization would probably be authorized to determine the length of time necessary to rectify the returns and their determination, in the absence of fraud, would be conclusive. But there is certainly nothing unreasonable in the view that such regulation has been committed to the said members of the board of equalization, but acting in the capacity of the board of trustees and thereby constituting the local legislative body. They have the necessary knowledge, and the question is one of legislative control within the restriction, of course, that any limitation should not be unreasonable.
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