McWhorter v. McWhorter

THOMPSON (R. L.), J.

This is an appeal from a decree partitioning real and personal property between joint tenants.

While the plaintiff and defendant were living together as husband and wife without the consummation of a marriage, they acquired by their joint efforts the real and personal property involved in this suit. March 16, 1921, for a valuable consideration two lots in Los Angeles, California, were conveyed to the parties to this action “as joint tenants.” A dwelling-house was afterward constructed on these lots, and the cost of the house and lots was paid for out of the joint earnings of the grantees. The ordinary articles of household furniture and equipment were also acquired and jointly used by them in the same manner, a list of which is enumerated in the decree. Dissensions arose between them, and they separated November 1, 1925. Upon the trial a judgment of partition was rendered and entered decreeing that each of the parties was entitled to an undivided one-half interest in both the real and the personal property, which was ordered to be sold and the proceeds to be distributed accordingly.

The chief contention of the appellant is that the evidence fails to support the findings of the court to the effect that the plaintiff lived and cohabited with the defendant “in good faith” believing that their relationship was equivalent to what has been termed a common-law

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marriage. There is a conflict of evidence in that regard, and much of the trial was devoted to this issue.

We are of the opinion that it is entirely immaterial so far as the determination of this appeal is concerned, whether they lived together in good faith as husband and wife, or otherwise. The evidence is ample to support the finding that they acquired and held the property as joint tenants. The deed to the real property expressly conveyed it to them as joint tenants. It is true that the deed did run to “Michael McWhorter and Hattie McWhorter, his wife, as joint tenants,” and that plaintiff was not in fact the lawful wife of the defendant, nor was her name really McWhorter. The term “his wife,” which was used in the deed was merely descriptive and surplusage. The identity of the grantee Hattie McWhorter not being questioned, although the name was assumed without warrant, it was nevertheless a good and valid conveyance. In 9 Cal. Jur. 127, section 30, it is said: “A grant to an actual person, by a fictitious or assumed name by which he is known and passes, or which he has assumed for the occasion, is valid.”