Trussless Roof Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
Before: Bishop
BISHOP, J., pro tem.
But one question is presented by these five proceedings to annul as many awards made by the respondent Commission. A collision between an interurban car and a passenger automobile containing five homeward bound employees of the petitioner, Trussless Roof Company, resulted in injuries to all five. The question presented is, Were these injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 831) ? The respondent Commission had jurisdiction to make the affirmative answer they did.
[93]
Without tracing the steps whereby the principle has been developed, it suffices to note that it is now established that injuries received by an employee,- while making use of transportation furnished by and under the control of his employer, as such, are compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, though the employee at the time was not at work but was going to or from the place of employment.
(Dominguez
v.
Pendola,
(1920) 46 Cal. App. 220 [188 Pac. 1025], and a multitude of cases reviewed in the notes found in 10 A. L. R. 169, 21 A. L. R. 1223, 24 A. L. R. 1233, and 62 A. L. R. 1438.) The use of the words “as such” is necessary because courtesy rides given by the employer do not give rise to liability under the statutes.
(Boggess
v.
Industrial Acc. Com.,
(1917) 176 Cal. 534 [L. R. A. 1918F, 883, 169 Pac. 75];
Gruber
v.
Mercy,
(1929) 7 N. J. Misc. Rep. 241 [145 Atl. 106].) In other words, the transportation has to be furnished as a part of the contract of employment, to come within the rule.
(In re Donovan,
(1914) 217 Mass. 76 [Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778, 104 N. E. 431].)
The Commission was warranted by the evidence in concluding that a term of the contracts of employment between petitioner Trussless Roof Company and the five injured men was that on a job beyond the ten-cent fare limit, transportation would be furnished. In a few instances it had been furnished by the use of company trucks. The recognized practice, however, was for one or more of the men to take others, he who furnished the conveyance to be reimbursed on one of two bases, at the option of the employer: Either six cents a mile for the distance driven, or a sum equal to what would have been the round-trip fares of those taken, had the trolley lines been used. No man paid fare to anyone, nor was anyone paid anything by the company with respect to transportation except those who furnished conveyances, and that as indicated. The particular automobile to be used was decided upon from day to day by the men themselves, the employer not knowing in advance, unless incidentally, who was to take whom. Once a week a report was made as to the amount of transportation each one had furnished and the subsequent pay cheek was increased by the amount allowed for furnishing transportation. The looseness of the arrangements thus
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