Security-First National Bank v. Superior Court
Before: Conrey
CONREY, P. J.
From the petition it appears that in the matter of the estate of John H. Coolman, deceased, certain contests were pending upon a petition for probate of will and for letters of administration. For the purpose of preserving the estate during time of contest the Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles was appointed special administrator and duly qualified in that office. On May 7, 1929, the court made its order denying probate of the will and appointed Walter Armel administrator of the estate. On June 12th Armel qualified as such administrator. On June 18th and 22d appeals were taken to the Supreme Court from the order of May 7th. On June 18th Armel petitioned for special letters of administration. The bank and the proponents of the will objected to the granting of special letters of administration to Armel, basing their objections on the ground that the bank was the duly appointed special administrator and that its appointment had never been revoked. Thereafter, on September 26, 1929, the. court appointed Armel special administrator of the estate, and directed that the bank deliver to Armel all the property of the estate in its possession. In this proceeding the petitioner contends that in making its order of September 26th the court acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction.
In the first place petitioner directs our attention to decisions of the Supreme Court which hold that a new administrator of a decedent’s estate cannot be appointed while a former administrator is in office, and that before there can be jurisdiction to make such appointment the former letters must be revoked.
(Haynes
v.
Meeks,
20 Cal. 288;
Estate of Hamilton,
34 Cal. 464;
Barboza
v.
Pacific Portland Cement Co.,
162 Cal. 36 [120 Pac. 767].) The foregoing decisions relate to the ordinary general letters of administration, but it is claimed that in principle they apply to special administrators as well.
“When letters testamentary or of administration on the estate of the decedent have been granted, the powers of the special administrator cease, and he must forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator all the property and effects
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