Marron v. County of San Diego
Before: Taggart
Synopsis
County Government Act—Judicial Construction—Re-enactment— Presumable Intention of Legislature.—Sections 42 and 43 of County Government Act of 1897, corresponding to sections 43 and 44 of the County Government Act of 1893, as construed by the supreme court in Arbios v. San Bernardino, 110 Cal. 583, were presumably enacted by the legislature with that construction in mind.
Id.—Claim Against County—Part Rejection by Supervisors—Second Presentation Essential Before Action.—When the supervisors have partly allowed and partly rejected a claim presented to them, it is necessary that the claim be presented at the next regular session of the board, and that the claimant indicate his unwillingness to accept the amount allowed in order that he may maintain an action against the county, and a suit brought without such presentation is premature, and judgment therein should be in favor of the county.
Id.—Rejection of Entire Claim.—If the whole claim presented is entirely rejected, no second presentation is required before suit can be maintained against the county.
TAGGART, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court of San Diego county in an action brought for the purpose of determining the validity of certain fees charged by the constable and justice of the peace of San Luis Rey township in that county, for the arrest of “brake-beam tourists” upon charges of “fraudulently evading the payment of railroad fare.” The board of supervisors rejected all items of plaintiff’s bill based upon arrests made upon such charges, and the matter being submitted to the superior court upon an agreed statement of the case, judgment was for the defendant and plaintiff appeals.
It appears from the complaint that plaintiff presented four causes of action, two for his own fees as constable and two for the fees of the justice of the peace which had been assigned to him. His own bills are alleged to have been: For January, 1907, official sendees rendered for defendant in serving process, transporting and feeding prisoners, etc., “aggregating in value” $84.35; for February for the same kind of services, “aggregating in value” $74.70. The justice of the peace’s official services for January are alleged to have aggregated $81 and those for February $66; and the prayer is for the aggregate of all these sums, to wit: $306.05. It is alleged that of the January bill of plaintiff items amounting to $10.25 were allowed and $74.10 were rejected; of his February bill $47.85 were allowed and $26.85 rejected; that of the bills of the justice of the peace items aggregating $15 were allowed and $66 were rejected in the January bill and $24 allowed and $42 rejected in the February bill. It is further alleged that all of the items rejected arose out of services rendered in cases in which persons were “charged with fraudulently evading the payment of railroad fare.”
It is stipulated that the claims against the county upon which this action is based were presented to the board of supervisors but once, at which time they were allowed in part and rejected in part, as above stated, and that they
[246]
“were never thereafter again presented to said board of supervisors for allowance. ’ ’
In the case of
Arbios
v.
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