People v. Wilson
Before: Houser, York
Opinion — Houser
HOUSER, J.
From a judgment following his conviction on each of two counts in an information wherein he was charged with the commission of the crime of robbery, and from an order by which his motion for a new trial was denied, defendant has appealed to this court.
Although on the trial of the action defendant was identified by the sole victim in each of the robberies as the person who committed the crime, by the testimony of each of several apparently reputable witnesses it was made to appear that at the time when such robbery was committed defendant could not have been present thereat; in other words, disregarding any question of the credibility of such witnesses, a complete and perfect alibi for defendant was established by the evidence presented by him. After instructing the jury as to the duty of the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt “each and every material fact relevant to the issue” and that in meeting such evidence the defendant was only required to present sufficient evidence to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any such material fact—the trial court gave to the jury the time-honored instruction set forth in section 1096 of the Penal Code (Stats. 1927, p. 1039), as follows:
“A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: ‘It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state
[430]
of the ease, which, .after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. ’ ”
The appeal herein is predicated upon the refusal of the trial court to give to the jury certain instructions requested by defendant which related to the law as applied to the evidence affecting the alibi of defendant. Such requested instructions were to the effect that if from the evidence the jury believed “that the defendant was not present at the time it was alleged or proven that the crime was committed, and therefore could not have committed the crime charged in the information, and did not aid or abet in its commission,’’ the verdict should be “not guilty.” The reply of the respondent to such claim is that, since the trial court fully instructed the jury with reference to the doctrine of reásonable doubt, as well as to the bounden duty of the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt “each and every fact relevant to the issue,” and since the presence of defendant at the place where and at the time when the robbery was committed was one of such necessary or essential facts, it should follow that the point presented by the requested instructions by defendant was fully covered by the instruction given, and, consequently, that the trial court committed no error in refusing to give either of the several instructions requested by defendant.
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