People v. Lucas

FINCH, P. J.

June 23, 1925, the defendant was indicted for the crime of making false entries in the hooks of a state bank. His demurrer to the indictment was overruled and his motion to dismiss it was denied. He was duly placed on trial, but the jury impaneled in the case was discharged because of inability to agree upon a verdict. October 30, 1925, a second indictment was presented and filed, charging the defendant with the same acts alleged in the first indictment and, in addition thereto, four acts of embezzlement. This was a new indictment and did not purport to he an amendment of the first. The defendant made a

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motion to dismiss the indictment and demurred thereto. Upon the submission of the motion and the demurrer, the court made the following order: “The motion to dismiss indictment is sustained, and the demurrer is sustained; the district attorney to go before the grand jury and amend the former indictment and bring in a second indictment as to the charges of embezzlement. . . . The court now orders that the order heretofore made, overruling the demurrer to the original indictment be set aside; the demurrer to the original indictment is now sustained, and the original indictment together with the second indictment is now resubmitted to the grand jury. The court orders that the whole matter of the two indictments be referred to the grand jury for consideration.” Two indictments, purporting to be amended indictments, were thereafter presented by the grand jury and filed. One charged the making of the same false entries and the other charged the embezzlements set forth in the second indictment. The defendant pleaded that he had been once placed in jeopardy on the charge of making the false entries. At the trial the court instructed the jury to find against the defendant on that plea. He was convicted of the crime of making the alleged false entries, and this appeal is from the judgment and the order denying a new trial.

Counsel for appellant says in his brief: “"The defendant relies for a reversal of the judgment upon the sole proposition that the court erred in instructing the jury to return a verdict for the people on the pleas of once in jeopardy.” He contends that the first indictment was not defective in the respects set out in his motion to dismiss and his demurrer thereto. He conceded at the oral argument that if the second trial had been had upon the first indictment the plea of once in jeopardy would not have been available to defendant, and there are many decisions in this state to that effect. Why a different rule should prevail in a case such as this does not appear. “A