Koepple v. Morrison

THOMPSON, J.

The petitioner and appellant, a former member of the legal profession who was disbarred on Febru

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ary 24, 1925, brought an action upon a claim assigned to him for the purpose of collection only in the justice’s court of Santa Ana township, where he stipulated to the fact that judgment of disbarment had been entered against him, and that the chose in action was assigned to him solely for the purpose of collection. Upon that stipulation the respondent, Justice of the Peace, refused to permit the petitioner to proceed with the trial and declined to hear him further, whereupon he filed a petition for the writ of mandate in the superior court. After hearing, judgment was entered denying the writ. This appeal is from that judgment.

Subsequent to the decision of

In re Hittson,

39 Cal. App. 91 [178 Pac. 149], in which it was held that one who had been disbarred had the same right to practice in the justice’s court as one who had not been admitted to the bar, and quite evidently in response to the suggestion therein contained that the legislature had the undisputed right to prevent a person who had been disbarred from appearing in a justice’s court, the legislature amended sections 299 and 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Stats. 1921, p. 100; Stats. 1923, p. 746), so that the material portions read as follows: Section 299: ”... During such suspension or disbarment the attorney shall be precluded from practicing as an attorney at law or as an attorney or agent of another in and before all courts, commissions and tribunals in the state, including justice courts, recorder’s courts and police courts, and from practicing as attorney or counselor at law in any manner and from holding himself out to the public as an attorney or counselor at law.” Section 300: “No person who has been an attorney and counsellor shall while a judgment of disbarment or suspension is in force, appear on his own behalf as plaintiff in the prosecution of any action where the subject of said action has been assigned to him subsequent to the entry of the judgment of disbarment or suspension.”

The appellant attacks that portion of the findings of fact which says that the claim was “assigned to the petitioner for the purpose of evading, nullifying or escaping the effect of said judgment of disbarment” and that he “was the agent of the person who had assigned said claim to him.” He also asserts that the conclusions of law to the same effect are without justification. It must be conceded that the