Lynch v. Bekins Van & Storage Co.

JAMES, J.

Plantiffs in this case were awarded judgment for the sum of $11,376, as the value of certain household goods, antique articles, bric-a-brac, etc., which had been delivered into the charge of defendant as a warehouse-keeper. The merchandise had been transported from an eastern point to Los Angeles by a corporation, conducted as an adjunct to the defendant, although separate in its operation and management. On the arrival of the merchandise in Los Angeles plaintiffs visited the office of the defendant and there, through the agent of defendant, arranged for the storage of the goods. The merchandise was taken in charge by the defendant and stored in a warehouse near the railway station, but before a receipt therefor had been delivered to the plaintiffs a fire occurred which destroyed the warehouse and its contents, including the property of plaintiffs. The warehouse in which the property was stored, as has already appeared, was not fireproof. Plaintiffs in suing to recover the value of their

[70]

property alleged that an express contract had been made with them, that the storage should be in a fireproof warehouse; second, that irrespective of the express verbal contract, defendant had, by numerous advertisements which had come to the attention of plaintiffs, represented that the storage furnished by it was fireproof, and that the plaintiffs relied upon such representations; and nothing having been- said by any agent of the defendant to the contrary, by the storage of the goods with defendant, plaintiffs contended that an implied contract arose that the merchandise was to be protected in a fireproof building. Both of these contentions were sustained by the trial judge, although the further claim that the fire occurred through the negligence of the defendant was decided against the plaintiffs. An appeal was taken from the judgment.

The trial judge having determined that there was an express contract for the furnishing of fireproof storage, and'the record disclosing evidence amply sufficient to sustain that finding, the judgment should be affirmed unless alleged errors pointed out in the admission and rejection of testimony are found to be meritorious. We think it unnecessary to go into any discussion of the question as to whether the implied contract arose by reason of the printed representations made by defendant as to the character of storage furnished by it. On the part of the plaintiffs the testimony showed that when the order was given to the defendant to store the goods of the plaintiffs, inquiry was made on the part of the plaintiffs of the person in charge of defendant’s office as to whether the storage would be “fireproof,” to which the defendant’s agent replied, ‘ ‘ Oh, yes. ’ ’ The plaintiffs were strangers in the city of Los Angeles and were not acquainted with the buildings used by the defendant for warehouse purposes. It seems that the defendant had a fireproof storehouse under its control, which was at a greater distance from the railroad tracks than the nonfireproof building in which the goods were stored. It is admitted that the defendant was able to and could furnish, when required, storage which by reason of the character of the building would furnish absolute protection against fire. The admission of evidence showing representations by advertisements and printed matter, to the effect that the defendant had at its disposal fireproof warehouses and offered to customers to furnish storage of that kind, was without error,