Guinou v. Webster

STURTEVANT, J.

On the night of June 7, 1930, near San Carlos, in San Mateo County, the plaintiff Mrs. Guinou was injured in an automobile collision. She was riding in a Ford coupe as the guest of Mr. and Mrs. Le Blanc. The car collided with a Pontiac being driven by the defendant. For the injuries sustained by Mrs. Guinou the plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages. From the judgment entered on the verdict against him the defendant has appealed.

1. The trial court of its own motion gave an instruction that the violation of a statute is negligence as a matter of law. The defendant calls to our attention that the plaintiffs introduced evidence to the effect that the defendant was driving 45 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Continuing, he argues that as the statute was worded at the time of the trial such speed was not a violation of the statute. (2 Peering’s Gen. Laws, p. 2507.) The plaintiffs reply that the instruction objected to stated nothing to the contrary. The record contains the opening

[31]

statement by the plaintiffs. Nothing therein is said regarding the defendant’s speed. The same remark may be made of the complaint. No one of the instructions was addressed, in terms, to excessive speed. However, several other statutory provisions were read to the jury. It cannot be ascertained from the record how the jury could have applied the instruction complained of to speed when no issue on that subject was before it. If it be conceded, as defendant claims, that the statute in force at the time of the trial governs the case, it follows that a speed of 45 miles per hour is not

ipso facto

negligence, but other facts must be established showing the negligence. Under that assumption the force of the defendant’s objection falls; because it then appears that no certain speed limit is prohibited by statute and the instruction could not have been considered as referring to speed.

2. The first paragraph of section 101 of the California Vehicle Act is as follows: “The headlights of motor vehicles shall be so constructed, arranged and adjusted that they (will, at all times mentioned in section 99 and under normal atmospheric conditions, produce ample driving light for the use of the operator of such vehicle but,) will not project a glaring or dazzling light to persons approaching such lights or to persons whom such headlights may approach.” (Parentheses ours.) Omitting the part in parentheses the court read it as an instruction. The defendant asserts (1) it garbles the law; (2) there was no evidence that his headlights were unlawful; and (3) there was no evidence that the construction, arrangement or adjustment of his headlights was the proximate cause or the contributing cause of the accident. To the objection that the instruction did not contain the whole of section 101 there are two answers. If the defendant desired the rest of the section read he was at liberty to make the request. In the next place it was not disputed that the accident happened after dark and that it was the duty of the defendant to have his lights lit, and it was not contended that normal atmospheric conditions did not exist. Therefore the omitted reference to those subjects could not have been prejudicial to the defendant.