Meyer v. Lincoln Realty Co.
Before: Kerrigan
Synopsis
Specific Performance—Vague Contract for Lease—Agreement Upon Specific Terms—Draft of Lease Unsigned—Statute of Frauds. Under a complaint alleging a vague contract for a lease, of which specific performance is sought, and also alleging a specific agreement upon the terms of a lease embodied in a draft thereof, which was unsigned by the defendant, such draft is within the statute of frauds, and is void and unenforceable.
Id.—Vague Contract Unenforceable.—A contract, to be susceptible of specific enforcement, must be certain and unequivocal in its terms; and a vague and uncertain contract is not capable of specific enforcement.
Id.—Uncertain Contract for Lease—Average Monthly Rental to be Graduated—Future Negotiation.—A receipt for deposit for a lease, calling for an average monthly rental to be graduated, and leaving the installments of the rent and the times of payment incomplete and uncertain, and leaving the amount of rent to be paid per month to be settled at some future negotiation between the parties, is too vague and uncertain to be specifically enforced.
KERRIGAN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered upon the refusal of the plaintiffs to amend their complaint after the demurrer of the defendant thereto had been sustained.
After some formal allegations and a description of the property involved in this litigation, the complaint sets forth that on September 30, 1908, the defendant agreed with the plaintiffs to let, lease and demise to them a certain store in a certain building to be erected on Market street in San Francisco, which said agreement is as follows;
[757]
“San Francisco, Cal., Sept. 30th, 1908.
“Received of Feet & Meyer the sum of Five Hundred (500) dollars, deposit to secure lease of store No. 6, 19 -.5x235 from westerly wall of emporium, for a period of ten (10) years from the date of possession at an average monthly rental of $845. per month to be graduated, with cash deposit of Five Thousand (5,000) dollars to be paid upon the execution of lease, upon which seven per cent (7%) interest is to be allowed; both principal and interest to be returned in equal monthly installments covering a period of ten (10) years.
“Lease to be delivered on or before October 1st and to be executed on or before October 3d, 1908.
“ [Corporation seal] LINCOLN REALTY CO.
“By A. O. Stewart, Sec.”
That upon the execution of said agreement the plaintiffs paid to the defendant $500, the sum acknowledged to have been received therein. That after the making of this agreement, to wit, on October 1, 1908, the parties agreed upon all the terms and conditions of a lease, but that the defendant, without any reason or cause therefor, refused to execute it. The complaint, after further alleging, among other formal matters, the willingness and ability of the plaintiffs to perform the covenants of the lease on their part, concludes with a prayer for a decree, directing that a lease embodying the terms of the agreement be executed by the defendant, and that it be specifically enforced.
The lease upon which it is alleged the parties agreed, not being signed by the defendant, is within the statute of frauds and is void.
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