Gates v. Tom Quong
Before: Chipman
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
CHIPMAN, P. J.
Action in interpleader to determine the right to certain moneys in the hands of plaintiff as the purchase price of certain prunes sold to him. Defendant Earl Fruit Company claimed the money under a crop mortgage executed to it by one Lee Toy. Defendant Tom Quong claimed under a garnishment served on.plaintiff, issued in a suit against said Toy.
It appears that Toy entered into possession of an orchard tract under an agreement with the owner, one Frank Buck. Toy executed a chattel mortgage on the growing crop to defendant company. One of the questions arising out of the controversy was whether Toy had any mortgagable interest in the prunes. Much attention is given in the briefs to this
[445]
question, appellant claiming that the agreement possessed all the elements necessary to constitute a leasehold interest in Toy, such as made his share of the prunes grown on the leased premises the subject of chattel mortgage. The court found against the defendant company on this issue, which finding is challenged as unsupported by the evidence. We do not find it necessary to pass upon this question.
The court found “that by the terms of said lease said Buck had the right and was exclusively empowered to sell and deliver to any person or persons he might direct, any and all fruit raised upon said demised premises. . . . That said prunes were sold by said Buck to said Gates ‘and’ were removed from said leased premises and were delivered to plaintiff. That said Earl Fruit Company did not know of said sale until said delivery was nearly completed. That it then notified said Lee Toy and said T. L. Gates that the proceeds of said sale must be paid to said Earl Fruit Company by virtue of said crop mortgage, but neither said Lee Toy nor said T. L. Gates agreed thereto. That no lien . . . existed upon said prunes or the proceeds of the sale thereof . . . after their removal from said leased premises in favor of said Earl Fruit Company.” The court further found “that no person representing the Earl Fruit Company was present at said sale of prunes, and that said Earl Fruit Company had no part nor voice therein and neither consented or objected thereto upon condition that the proceeds should be paid to said company, or by reason of any conditions whatever”; and that neither Buck, nor Toy, nor Gates at any time agreed with one another or with said company “that the purchase price of said lot of prunes should be paid by plaintiff to said Earl Fruit Company, for the purpose of being applied upon said attempted crop mortgage, or for any purpose whatever.”
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