Webb v. Boyle

California Court of Appeal Aug 11, 1932 No. Docket No. 971.Published

Before: Marks

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Holding. The court held that the respondents were private carriers rather than common carriers because they did not hold themselves out to serve the public indifferently and operated only under special contracts. Consequently, they were not subject to the permit requirements of the Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act.

Issues

Whether the respondents operated as a common carrier subject to the Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act.
Whether the trial court's findings that respondents were private carriers were supported by the evidence.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“They accepted goods for transportation only upon special contracts and did not undertake “generally and for all persons indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for hire’’.”

“The findings are amply supported by the evidence and support the' judgment.”

MARKS, Acting P. J.

Appellant, who had a permit from the Railroad Commission of California to operate as a transportation company under the provisions of the Auto Stage and Truck 'Transportation Act (Stats. 1917, p. 330, and the acts amendatory thereof), instituted this action to enjoin respondents from transporting goods over the public highways of the state, alleging that they were operating as a transportation company as defined in the aforementioned act without a permit from the Railroad Commission. Judgment was rendered for respondents. This judgment is attacked here upon the ground that the findings upon which it rests are not supported by the evidence.

[327]

The facts in this ease are not involved and the law applicable to them is so well settled that an extended discussion of them is unnecessary.

The portions of the Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act applicable here bring under its terms a transportation company operating as a common carrier over any public highway in the state between fixed termini, or over a regular route and not operating exclusively within an incorporated city and town. In

Forsyth

San Joaquin Light etc. Corp.,

208 Cal. 397 [281 Pac. 620, 623], the Supreme Court said: “Section 2168 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as follows: ‘Every one who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier, of whatever he thus offers to carry.’ ‘Private carriers are such as carry for hire and do not come within the definition of common carrier. Certain prominent characteristics mark the difference between these two classes. To impress upon one the character of common carrier it must be shown that he “undertakes generally and for all persons indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for hire; and that his public profession of his employment be such that if he refuses, without some just ground, to carry goods for anyone, in the course of his employment and for a reasonable and customary price, he will be liable to an action.” On the other hand, private carriers are not bound to carry for any person unless they enter into a special agreement so to do.’ (4 Cal. Jur. 815.) This same principle is enunciated in the case of

Webb v. Boyle

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