People v. Knewbow

CONREY, P. J.

This appeal is from the judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury, which followed the conviction of defendant of the commission of the crime of grand theft, and from an order by which the motion of defendant for a new trial was denied.

It is unnecessary to make a detailed statement of the facts. The essential substance of the charge against defendant and the ultimate fact established by the evidence to the satisfaction of the trial court was that by means of false pretenses made by defendant as to his ownership of a certain piece of real property, he procured a loan from the complaining witness of the sum of $50,000, and as security for the repayment of which loan in part he executed a deed of trust to the property, of which deed the complaining witness was the beneficiary.

At the outset it may be remarked that an observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of

People

v.

Byrne,

160 Cal. 217, 225 [116 Pac. 521, 525], seems appropriate to the situation presented by the record herein, to wit: “While a mere reading of the record in this case necessarily leaves one in grave doubt on the question of the defendant’s guilt, there is certainly enough in the evidence to sustain the conclusion of the jury and trial judge who saw and heard the various witnesses, and who were in a much better position to determine the truth than a court that does not possess such an advantage.”

Although as appears from the record of the proceedings had on the trial of the action, as between the evidence presented by the prosecution and that adduced on behalf of defendant, a very decided conflict existed, nevertheless, since

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considered by itself the evidence which tended to establish the guilt of defendant was sufficient for that purpose, in accordance with the well-established rule which governs the pbwers of appellate tribunals, and in the absence of certain exceptions to such rule not here applicable, this court is unauthorized to disturb the judgment because of the assumed fact that, judged by the cold record, the evidence either apparently preponderated in favor of the innocence of defendant, or at least likewise was sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.