People v. Green

CRAIG, J.

Appellant was convicted in the superior court upon an information charging him with assault with intent to commit the infamous crime against nature, denounced by section 220 of the Penal Code; the charging part of which information, essential to this appeal, read as follows:

“W. S. Green is accused by the District Attorney of Riverside County and State of- California, by this information, of the crime of a felony committed as follows: The said W. S. Green on or about the 20th day of March, 1923, at the said County of Riverside, State of California, and

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before the filing of this information, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an assault upon the person of Paul Maupin, with the intent then and there to commit the infamous crime against nature.”

Two grounds are urged for reversal of the judgment and order denying appellant’s motion for new trial: (1) That the information does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense amounting to a felony, in that it fails to charge an attempt to commit an offense upon the person of a named individual; and (2) that the information therefore charges no more than assault, a misdemeanor, of which the superior court did not have jurisdiction.

Section 220 of the Penal Code provides that: “Every person who assaults another with intent to commit rape, the infamous crime against nature, mayhem, robbery, or grand larceny, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than fourteen years.”

The question presented by appellant, and which is decisive of both grounds of this appeal, is as to the necessity of designating in the information the intended victim of the infamous crime which constituted the object of the assault. Appellant cites authority to maintain the proposition that an accusation must contain all of the ingredients of the offense with which the defendant is charged, in direct language, leaving no essential to be reached by inference or argument. This is admittedly a correct statement of the law. It is also true that a charge is insufficient which states mere legal conclusions; but the distinction which is vital here is that between a mere legal conclusion and an ultimate fact. In 31 Corpus Juris, page 711, section 266, it is said: “Where a charge in the language of the statute charges a mere legal conclusion, or where it connects accused with the crime by mere inference or argument, a more particular statement of the facts is necessary. But a charge following the statute is sufficient where it states ultimate facts.” It is ordinarily sufficient to charge an offense in the language of the statute if the latter defines it or describes the acts constituting the offense, especially where the words used have a well-recognized meaning.