Morris v. Board of Education

HOUSER, J.

For a period covering several years prior to the happening of the incident which gave rise to the institution of the proceeding which forms the basis of the instant appeal, respondent herein was a teacher in the public school of the city of Pasadena, in which position and in the course of her service therein, she acquired a status described in the statute (sec. 1609, Pol. Code) and generally known as “permanent”. Immediately preceding the commencement of the school year beginning in September, 1925, for some undisclosed reason the appellant Board of Education, acting through the county superintendent of schools, “informed” respondent that it refused to employ her as a “permanent” teacher for that particular school year; and ever after such information was so conveyed to respondent the said Board of Education refused to permit and prevented respondent from performing duties as a “permanent” teacher in said public school. After a lapse of more than three years following the said refusal of the said Board of Education to permit respondent to instruct in said public school as a “permanent” teacher, during which time at intermittent intervals, at the request of respondent, the said Board of Education did permit her to teach and she did teach in said school as a “substitute” teacher, the proceeding, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted in the superior court. In pursuance of a writ of mandate issued by said court at the instance of respondent, judgment was rendered by which in substance the said Board of Education was directed to reinstate respondent as a “permanent” teacher in said school, and to pay respondent the salary to which she would have become entitled had she been permitted to teach as a “permanent” teacher during the time that she was not so occupied by reason of said refusal of the said Board of Education. It is from such judgment that the appeal herein is prosecuted.

[752]

It is urged by appellants that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. From the record it appears that by their demurrer, as well as by their answer to the complaint, the defendants in the action raised the same point; and it is conceded by the appellants that by its findings of fact in effect the trial court found that such a defense to the action was untenable. The appeal from the judgment is upon the judgment-roll only. Since every intendment favors the validity of the judgment, it must be presumed that on the trial in the lower court-sufficient evidence was presented to sustain its findings of fact.