People v. Casdorf

BURNETT, J.

The first point made by appellants is that the trial court should have sustained the demurrer to the indictment on the ground that it did not conform to the requirements of sections 950, 951, and 952 of the Penal Code, “in that there is uncertainty as to the offense charged and the particular circumstances of the offense charged.” It is admitted, however, that they were accused in the language of the statute in that “They were, and each of them was then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly a member of an organization, society, group and assemblage of persons known and designated as ‘The Industrial Workers of the World,’ sometimes known and referred to as the I. W. W. and sometimes known and referred to as the ‘One Big Union,’ which said organization, society, group and assemblage of persons was then and there organized and assembled to advocate, teach and abet criminal syndicalism. ’ ’ This question has been recently considered by this court in the case of

People

v. Roe, 58 Cal. App. 690 [209 Pac. 381], wherein the charging part of the indictment was in the identical language of that before us, and it was held to be sufficient to so follow the language of the statute. We may re-

[109]

fer also to

People

v.

Steelik,

187 Cal. 203 [203 Pac. 78], and

People

v.

Taylor,

187 Cal. 378 [203 Pac. 85], cited in the Roe case, wherein the same doctrine is enunciated. The question must be deemed settled adversely to the contention of appellants and no further discussion is called for.

It is urged that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. In this connection the particular contention is that the character of the organization after the enactment of the Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919 (Stats. 1919, p. 281) was not shown to have been within the inhibition of the law. There is a claim that the organization, in compliance with public sentiment as embodied in said statute, changed its purposes and modified its methods and that the evidence of what was advocated and practiced by the society related entirely to the old organization and not to it in its present form. In this appellants are in error. It is true that a large portion of the voluminous transcript is taken up with a recital of what the organization taught and practiced prior to 1919, but our examination of the record has convinced us that it reveals sufficient basis for the implied finding of the jury that in February, 1922, defendants were members of “an organization, . . . which said organization, society, group and assemblage of persons, was then and there organized and assembled to advocate, teach and aid and abet criminal syndicalism” as that term is defined in the statute. Indeed, the evidence of the character of said organization in the ease at bar is substantially the same as in