Peterson v. Hopkins
Before: Conrey
[34]
CONREY, P. J.
In accordance with the provisions of section 3738 of the Political Code, the auditor of Los Angeles County furnished to defendant assessor of said county, blank “personal property” receipts, of the year 1931, in the required form and duly numbered, and charged the assessor with the number of receipts so issued and delivered. In said section 3738 it is provided that “On the first Monday in August, the assessor shall return all unused receipts, and the auditor shall credit him with all numbers returned.”
This proceeding was commenced in the superior court by petition filed November 4, 1931. At that time, and thereafter, the assessor had in his possession a large number of said blank receipts, unused, and which he refused to return to the auditor. This is a proceeding by petitioner as a taxpayer of said county, to compel the return of said unused blank receipts, by the assessor to the auditor. Prom the judgment entered, ordering that the writ of mandate issue, the assessor appeals.
Since the amendment of section 3738 of the Political Code in the year 1907, there has been no further amendment thereof, and the section has never been the subject of a direct repeal. The ease for the plaintiff herein rests upon the above-quoted provisions of the section. It is the contention of appellant that by virtue of subsequent legislation there is an implied repeal of this section in so far as it required that “on the first Monday in August the assessor shall return all unused receipts”.
Prior to the enactment of section 12% of article XIII of the Constitution of California (section adopted November 4, 1924), taxes upon taxable notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, or mortgages (commonly known under the term intangible property) were assessed at the same time and in the same manner as other personal property. The duty of the assessor to assess all property for each fiscal year was provided for by Political Code section 3629. Under that section the duties of the assessor with relation to assessments began on the first Monday of March and, as far as actual assessment was concerned, ended on the first Monday of July of the same year. The only extensions of time for the performance of the duties of the assessor were those provided for in section 3681 during sessions of the county board of equalization, and the provisions
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