Hopkins v. Sanderson

JAMES, J.

The plaintiff herein was awarded in the trial court a writ of mandate to compel the payment to her of certain money which she alleged was due her for three months’ services as librarian for the Whittier Union High School District. She alleges that she was employed by the board of trustees of said district on the fourth day of June, 1915. This

[142]

employment was denied on the part of the defendants, and it was alleged affirmatively that there had been an offer made to the plaintiff to employ her in the capacity of librarian, said offer being made with the express condition that notice of acceptance should' be furnished within twenty days, and that no such notice was furnished within said time. On behalf of the plaintiff there was introduced in evidence a minute record of the board of trustees of a meeting held on June 4, 1915, wherein the employment of various persons as teachers and in other capacities was recorded, the plaintiff being one of the number mentioned in that minute. Upon this proof plaintiff rested as having made out a

prima facie

case. In the answer a copy of the document which it was alleged had been sent to the plaintiff, notifying her of her employment as librarian, was set out. An affidavit contradicting the genuineness and due execution of the instrument was filed, raising' an issue as to that matter. That notice contained the following provision: “This notice is in conformity with section 1617 of the California School Code. An acceptance of same is required under provisions of same section, within twenty days. Failure to comply with such provision renders the position vacant.” The original notice was not introduced in evidence. When the defendants sought to prove by an officer of the school board that the notice as alleged had been sent to the plaintiff, it was objected that no demand-had been made for the production of the original, and that secondary evidence to establish the fact was not proper to be received. There was considerable argument had at the trial upon the question raised by the objection. However, without objection, the president of the school board was permitted to testify that the board of trustees elected the plaintiff with the proviso as outlined in a notice which was sent to her,—that ratification or acceptance by the employee must be signed and returned within twenty days, or the office would become vacant. It was, therefore, sufficiently made to appear that the employment of the petitioner as made by the board at its meeting of June 4, 1915, was conditional upon notice of acceptance being received within twenty days thereafter. As we have before stated, it was not contended that there was any such acceptance within the time provided; in fact, the express testimony showed that the plaintiff did. not attempt to comply with the requirement until after the twenty days had expired.