Chance v. Kobsted

California Court of Appeal Apr 2, 1924 No. Civ. No. 4733.Published

Before: Lang-Don

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Holding. The court held that a wife cannot maintain an action to quiet title to community personal property because her interest in such property is a mere expectancy, and the husband is the proper party to bring such an action.

Issues

Whether a wife has the legal capacity to maintain an action to quiet title to community personal property.
Whether the husband is a necessary party to an action involving the title to community personal property.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The plaintiff’s interest in the community property involved here was a mere expectancy and not a title or interest.”

“Until such dissolution, either by divorce or the death of one spouse, the wife’s interest was an inchoate one and not such as to form the basis for an action to quiet title to the property.”

“The subject of the action was community property. . . . Therefore, the husband was the proper plaintiff.”

[435]

LANG-DON, P. J.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment against him for $200 in an action which the plaintiff: brought against him involving the title to certain personal property alleged to have been the community property of herself and her. husband, Charles T. Chance. She alleged that at the time of the filing of the complaint she was the lawful wife of Charles T. Chance; that in October, 1921, he deserted her to consort with one Midge Bowers; that thereafter, on November 5, 1921, he purchased certain furniture with community funds and on December 21, 1921, commenced an action for divorce against plaintiff; that plaintiff, on cross-pleadings, obtained judgment in said action for separate maintenance and, on May 27, 1922, Midge Bowers sold said furniture to defendant. Plaintiff alleged that counsel fees and money for her separate maintenance allowed to her by the court in the divorce proceedings remain unpaid and that an execution was issued to enforce payment of the same and that the sheriff levied upon this personal property in the hands of the defendant as property of the community. There are additional allegations to the effect that Charles T. Chance has departed from the city and county of San Francisco, California, and cannot be found; that a warrant for his arrest has been issued under the provisions of section 270a of the Penal Code; that the defendant claims some interest in the property adverse to plaintiff. The prayer is that the defendant be required to set forth the nature of his interest and that the court declare that the defendant has no interest in the property and that the title thereto is in plaintiff.

A demurrer, general and special, was filed in the complaint and overruled, and the defendant answered, stating that he purchased the furniture from' the said Midge Bowers, acting for herself and for Charles T. Chance; that the household furniture so purchased by defendant had been openly and notoriously possessed by the said Midge Bowers for a period of six months or more preceding the said purchase by the defendant; that the sale was open and free from fraud and that the defendant paid the reasonable value of said furniture for the same.

The appeal is upon the judgment-roll and the findings recite that at all times mentioned in the complaint the plaintiff was the wife of Charles T. Chance, who had de

Chance v. Kobsted

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LANG-DON, P. J.

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