Estate of Seipel

California Court of Appeal Mar 8, 1933 No. Docket No. 8860.Published

Before: Jamison

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Holding. The court held that a beneficiary's actions to compel executrices to inventory estate assets did not constitute a contest of the will triggering a forfeiture clause, but reversed the judgment because it was prematurely entered before findings were filed.

Issues

Whether a beneficiary's actions to compel the inclusion of assets in an estate inventory constitute a contest of the will triggering a forfeiture clause.
Whether a judgment rendered prior to the filing of findings of fact is premature.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It is universally held, we think, that such a clause in a will, like all other forfeiture provisions, is to be strictly construed.”

“It nowhere appears in either of said actions that respondent was contesting the validity of the will, nor any of its provisions.”

“We are of the opinion that the judgment in the case at bar was premature in that it was rendered prior to the filing of the findings with the clerk.”

JAMISON, J., pro tem.

Katherina Seipei died on March 4, 1929. She left a will by which she bequeathed and devised her estate to her three daughters, the appellants and respondent, share and share alike, except certain jewelry, which she bequeathed to each separately. The will contained the following provisions: “ . . . provided, however, that if any of my said children shall commence any proceedings to contest this will, or shall fail to abide by any of its provisions, that then, and in that event all property be

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queathed or devised to such contesting or objecting child, shall not pass to her, except the sum of ten dollars, payable out of my personal estate, but shall belong to and become part of the residue of my estate, to pass under this will to the non-contesting and non-objecting children, share and share alike.”

On August 8, 1930, respondent filed a petition for a partial distribution to her of the sum of $1,000 and for the distribution to her of the jewelry bequeathed to her by the said will. The will was admitted to probate on March 20, 1929, and appellants duly qualified as executrices thereof. Appellants filed an answer to said petition both as executrices of said estate and as individuals. By their answer they denied that partial distribution could be made, owing to the financial condition of the estate, and also alleged that respondent had forfeited all her interests under the will; that said forfeiture was created by two actions commenced by respondent against the executrices, one of which (No. 217,468) was filed March 19, 1930, and the other (No. 52,329) on July 21, 1930. Upon the hearing had on said petition for partial distribution the trial court rendered judgment ordering partial distribution as prayed for, and from this judgment appellants have taken this appeal.

The main contention of appellants is that by the commencement of the said two actions respondent, under the foregoing provision of the will, has forfeited all of her interests in the said estate. The first of these actions appears to be one demanding an accounting by appellants of certain shares of stock and bank deposits owned by deceased at the date of her death. This action was dismissed by respondent on April 4, 1930. The other of said actions alleged fraud upon the part of appellants, by means of which they had possessed themselves of said shares of stock and money deposited in said banks, respondent, asking therein that appellants be required to inventory same as part of the assets of the estate. Upon the trial of this case appellants had judgment. The will in question was executed June 11, 1922. No mention is made in the will of the shares of stock, nor of the money on deposit in the banks.

Estate of Seipel

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