People v. French

FINCH, P. J.

While a prisoner in the state prison at Folsom the defendant was taken out to work under guard on a highway in Trinity County. The information charges him with the crime of escaping from the surveillance of his guards in that county. He was duly convicted of the crime charged and prosecutes this appeal from the judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for a new trial.

On his arraignment the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter he moved the court for permission to withdraw his plea in order to interpose a demurrer to the information. The motion was denied. After conviction

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the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment was denied, these rulings need not be specifically considered because the questions of law involved are the same as those raised by other contentions hereinafter noticed.

It is contended that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict in that while the defendant was committed to the state prison at San Quentin he was taken from the prison at Folsom to the road camp in Trinity County. The defendant was sentenced to- imprisonment in the state prison of the state of California and the sheriff was directed, as the law requires, to deliver the prisoner to the warden of the state prison at San Quentin. When thereafter the defendant was transferred to Folsom prison he was committed to that prison in the sense in which the word “committed” is used in section 106 of the Penal Code (as amended by Stats. 1921, -p. 77), under which he was charged. The evidence shows that the defendant was a prisoner in Folsom prison at and prior to the time he was taken therefrom to the road camp. That fact is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.

Complaint is made of the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that if the defendant believed he had permission to leave camp and, so believing, went and remained beyond the limits thereof he is not guilty of escape unless, at the time of leaving or while away, he had or formed the intention of escaping, and that such intention must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At defendant’s request, the court instructed the jury that “before you can find the defendant guilty in this case, you must be satisfied in your own mind, beyond all reasonable doubt, that he intended to escape from confinement, and you are further instructed that even though the defendant might have gone beyond the limits of the road camp, he is not guilty of escape unless he went or remained away with the intent to escape.” A court is not required to repeat an instruction which has been once given.