Doyle v. Superior Court
Before: Houser
HOUSER, J.
From the petition herein it appears that heretofore, to wit, on June 4, 1929, pursuant to an application filed by Turner Oil Company, a corporation, in the Superior Court in the County of Los Angeles, for an order to perpetuate the testimony of each of four persons named in such application, four several orders were issued by said court by which each of said persons was directed to appear at a designated time and place for the purpose of giving his deposition; that following service of such order upon each of such persons, each of them duly appeared as directed in the order, ]jut refused to give any testimony. Thereafter, in due course and because of such refusal to give his testimony as directed, each of such persons was ordered by the said Superior Court to appear before it on a specified date to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of said court. Thereupon, the persons so cited for contempt,
[654]
claiming that the application for the order to perpetuate their testimony was so lacking in essential allegations that it constituted no foundation for either or any of the several orders made by the Superior Court in the matter, applied to this court for a writ of review, to the end that such orders be annulled.
Without setting forth at length the application in question, it may suffice briefly to state that following its entitlement and address to the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, in effect the application contained the statements: That the applicant expected to be a party plaintiff in an action to be brought in said Superior Court; that said action would involve the determination of the validity of a certain agreement between the city of Long Beach and Charles Torson, by which agreement said Charles Torson was employed by the city of Long Beach to do certain construction work in connection with Pump Sewer District Number Ten, city of Long Beach; that by said action applicant proposed to furthermore determine the validity of all bonds issued in connection with the above work; that the names of the persons whom the applicant expected would be adverse parties in said action were the city of Long Beach, Charles Torson, Walter Horne, Long Beach Insurance Agency and/or its directors and/or certain of its stockholders; that applicant was the owner of about fifty acres of real property;' situate in Pump Sewer District Number Ten, Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California; that said property had become subject to an alleged assessment of over twenty thousand dollars for the aforesaid work done under the above-mentioned contract; and that it was necessary to determine whether or not the assessments were valid in order to perfect title to the above property in which applicant was interested as owner as aforesaid. Then followed a designation of each of the persons whose testimony was expected to be perpetuated, his residence addr^s, the statement that he was a necessary and material witness for the applicant on the trial of the expected action and that his testimony would be necessary and material in the proseen-tion thereof. The application also contained the statement that by the first of such named persons the applicant expected to prove that the Long Beach Insurance Agency was the agent for the Pacific Indemnity Company^ and/or Swett
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