People v. Palassou
Before: Cooper
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Manslaughter—Discharge of Prisoner for Delay of Trial—Dismissal—Future' Prosecution not Barred.—Where a defendant, charged with manslaughter, was upon his own motion discharged from custody, and the information dismissed because he had not been brought to trial within sixty days, as required by law, this was not a bar to a future prosecution under a new information for the same offense.
Id.—Pleas of Former Acquittal and Once in Jeopardy—Proper Instruction.—Where the defendant, on account of such discharge and dismissal, interposed pleas of “former acquittal” and of “once in jeopardy,” the court had the right to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the people upon the pleas.
Id.—Killing of Wife—Evidence—Prior Assault—Statements of Defendant—Modification of Requested Instructions.—Where defendant was charged with manslaughter in killing his wife, and the daughter testified to statements made by him to her, when she went to her mother after hearing her cry from the effects of a prior assault defendant had just made upon her, a requested instruction for defendant as to such statements was properly modified by omitting matter of argument, and as to the effect of evidence, and where, as so modified, the jury was charged that such statements could only be considered for the purpose of showing his conduct when they were made, it was as favorable as to defendant as he had any right to expect under the circumstances.
Id.—Evidence of Threats of Deceased—Requested Instruction Properly Refused.-—-Where the evidence conflicts as to whether the wife’s death was accidental or was the result of a blow from the defendant, the jury had the right to consider evidence of previous threats made by defendant against Ms wife, in determining whether or not the blow given by him was intentional and unlawful or aeeidental; and the court properly refused a requested instruction that evidence of such threats could only be considered upon the question of intent or motive.
Id.—Evidence of Brutal Course of Conduct Toward Wife—Motive for Death.—Evidence was properly allowed to show a brutal course of conduct of defendant toward Ms wife, on numerous prior occasions, which ultimately culminated in her death, not for the mere purpose of showing distinct and unconnected crimes, but as shedding light on the question as to defendant’s motive, and whether or not the death was the result of a blow or of an accident. Evidence which shows a motive, or throws light upon the facts and circumstances leading up to the particular crime, is admissible, although the acts and conduct on prior occasions may of themselves have constituted a distinct crime.
COOPER, P. J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of the crime of manslaughter and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
The court correctly refused the instruction requested by defendant’s counsel by which it was sought to leave the jury to pass upon the question as to whether or not the special pleas, interposed by defendant, of a former acquittal and of once in jeopardy had been proven, and in lieu thereof instructed the jury to find for the people upon both such pleas. There was no conflict in the evidence, which was to the effect that the defendant had upon the prior occasion been in jail, charged with the same offense for which he was here tried, and was upon his own motion discharged and the information dismissed because he had not been brought to trial within sixty days as required by law. This was not a bar to a future
[125]
prosecution under a new information for the same offense (Pen. Code, sec. 1387;
In re Bergerow,
136 Cal. 293, [68 Pac. 773]), and the court had' the right to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the people upon the pleas.
(People
v.
Ammerman,
118 Cal. 28, [50 Pac. 15].)
It is claimed that the court erred in eliminating certain parts of defendant’s requested instruction numbered 34, and in giving the instruction with the omission of the said parts. The instruction as requested and as given related to the testimony of defendant’s daughter Emelie as to certain statements made by deceased, who was the mother of Emelie and the wife of defendant, the statements having been made at a time when Emelie went to her mother after hearing her mother cry from the effects of an assault defendant had just made upon her. The jury were told by the instruction as given that the statements made by the deceased in the presence and hearing of the daughter were admitted for the sole purpose of showing the conduct of the defendant at the time such statements were made. The eliminated portions of the instruction contained matter argumentative and charging as to the effect of the evidence. In the eliminated portion the court was requested to tell the jury that the statements heard by the daughter and to which she had testified could not be considered by the jury as “tending to prove their truthfulness or any other fact than the one for which they were admitted.” The instruction as given plainly charged the jury that the statements could not be considered by the jury for any other purpose except for the one purpose of showing the conduct of the defendant at the time of such statements. This was certainly as favorable to defendant as he had the right to expect under the circumstances.
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)