McCray v. Manning

ALLEN, P. J.

The complaint filed herein by plaintiff alleged ownership by plaintiff of real property within a certain road improvement district, No. 9, in Los Angeles County; that the defendant supervisors had through a resolution of intention ordered the improvement of a certain highway therein by grading and oiling the same and constructing therein curbs, sidewalks, and gutters, and had provided that to cover the cost and expenses of such work bonds were to be issued to the amount of the same, and a special fund for the payment of said bonds to be constituted, partly by the transfer of moneys from the county road fund and partly by levying a special assessment tax upon the land within the district; that pursuant to such resolution of intention, a contract was entered into between the supervisors and defendant Law for the work of improving said road; that said contractor is about to begin work on said road; that defendant Hunt threatens to and will, unless restrained, upon completion of such work issue the bonds provided by said act, and that the board of supervisors threaten to levy an assessment upon the property within said road district to pay the principal and interest of said bonds. Plaintiff prays for an injunction restraining defendants from further proceeding under said contract and the performance of any acts thereunder. To this complaint a general demurrer was filed, which being sustained by the

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trial court and no amendment thereto being had, judgment went for defendants, from which judgment plaintiff appeals.

This appeal rests solely upon the claim of appellant that the-act under which this proceeding is sought to be taken (Stats. 1907, p. 806) is unconstitutional in that, the title thereto violates the constitutional inhibition found in section 24 of article IV, which provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title, it being contended that more than one subject is embraced therein. The title to the act in question is in these words: “An act to provide for work upon public roads, streets, avenues, boulevards, lanes and alleys not within the territory of incorporated cities or towns; for the incidental establishment of grades thereof; for the construction therein or thereon of sidewalks, sewers, manholes, bridges, cesspools, gutters, tunnels, curbing and crosswalks; for the issue of bonds representing the costs and expenses thereof; for a special fund derived in part from the county road fund and in part by special assessment upon a district, and for the establishment of such districts.” It is plain to us that the only subject embraced within this title has reference to the improvement of highways, together with providing means for payment of the cost thereof, either by way of general improvement, as is shown to be the object in the case under consideration, or certain specific improvements in furtherance of such general improvements, and whether general or special, they are nevertheless improvements and proper methods for the attainment of the ends sought by the act; and therefore not in conflict with the constitutional provision quoted.