Keck v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal Oct 28, 1930 No. Docket No. 7512.Published

Before: Craig

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Holding. The court held that the California Vehicle Act's provision authorizing administrative officers to conduct hearings and suspend driver's licenses for reckless driving is constitutional and does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power. Consequently, the superior court properly sustained a demurrer to the petitioner's request for a trial regarding his license suspension.

Issues

Whether the California Vehicle Act unconstitutionally confers excessive judicial authority upon executive officers to suspend driver's licenses.
Whether the superior court erred in sustaining a demurrer to a petition for mandamus seeking a trial on the merits of a license suspension.

Disposition. Writ denied.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the functions of such a board or commission are in this regard not an exercise of “the judicial power of the state” as contemplated by the Constitution, but that they are quasi judicial, and that statutes conferring such power are constitutional.”

“it would have served no good purpose for the superior court to have set the matter down for hearing.”

“We think the demurrer was properly sustained.”

CRAIG, J.

A verified complaint having been filed with the Division of Motor Vehicles, department of public works, charging the petitioner herein with having driven an automobile in a careless and reckless manner, and with being an habitual reckless driver, his license was suspended after a hearing thereon. He thereafter applied to the superior court for a trial and determination of the question as to his right to a license, to which application a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. He now petitions for a writ of

mandamus

requiring the overruling of the demurrer and requiring said court to set the cause for trial.

The grounds of the application to the superior court were that the chief of the Division of Motor Vehicles acted in excess of his authority in suspending petitioner’s license, that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant such action, and that petitioner was thereby deprived of his “free exer^ cise and enjoyment of his liberty and property”. The California Vehicle Act is attacked as being unconstitutional in that it attempts to confer upon executive officers excessive judicial authority. It is provided by section 73 thereof that certain specified officers, upon receipt of a verified complaint that an operator is a reckless, negligent or incompetent driver, may conduct a hearing to determine whether his license shall be suspended or revoked; that the chief of the division or person holding such hearing shall prepare findings upon the evidence received and considered; and that the license may be suspended for a period of six months or revoked if the findings be to the effect that such person is incompetent or unfit to drive for any reason authorizing the refusal of a license, or by reason of negligent or reckless driving which has endangered life, limb or property. All of the decisions cited by the petitioner hold or adhere to the rule that a commission or board may be empowered by legislative act to ascertain the existence of facts upon the finding

[253]

of which the right to continue in the practice of a profession or business may depend. It is therein expressly held that the functions of such a board or commission are in this regard not an exercise of “the judicial power of the state” as contemplated by the Constitution, but that they are

Keck v. Superior Court

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CRAIG, J.

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