E. Martin & Co. v. Brosnan
Before: Lennon
Synopsis
Estates of Deceased Persons—Action on Rejected Claim—Administratrix as Witness for Plaintiff—Motion to Strike Out Properly Denied.—In an action on a rejected claim against the estate of a deceased person, where the administratrix of the estate was called as a witness for the plaintiff, was examined and cross-examined, without objection to her testimony as a whole, the defendant cannot be heard to complain, after the witness has left the stand, that her evidence was objectionable as a whole, and a motion then made to strike out all of her evidence, not based upon any valid objection previously stated, was properly denied.
Id.—Cross-examination of Plaintiff’s Witness—Question Calling for Incompetent Hearsay—Exclusion by Court of Its Own Motion.—While, ordinarily, it is the better and safer practice for the trial court to defer action upon the admission or rejection of evidence until a proper objection is made by the party interested in having the evidence excluded, yet, where the defendant, on cross-examination of a witness for the plaintiff, asked a question clearly calling for incompetent hearsay, the trial court is not compelled to hear and determine the cause, either in whole or in part, upon improper evidence, and, in the exercise of its undoubted right to control the conduct of the trial, it may of its own motion rightfully refuse to receive such clearly incompetent evidence.
Id.—Admission of Claim as Evidence—Showing Against Bar of Statute not Required—Waiver of Formal Defects.—The claim sued upon against the estate was properly admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant. It was not necessary that sueh claim should show on its face that it is not barred by the statute of limitations; and in so far as the objection was directed to the formal sufficiency of the claim, its general rejection in the first instance, without special reason assigned, must be deemed a waiver of any formal defects therein.
Id.—Admission in Answer of Presentation and Rejection of Claim —Proof in Support of Action.—Where the answer affirmatively admitted the presentation and rejection of the claim, no evidence thereof is required, but it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the action thereon is founded upon the same claim which was presented to the defendant for allowance.
Id.—Promise of Administratrix to Pay Debt of Deceased Husband to Plaintiff—Credits on Account—^Novation not Established-^Intent.—A promise by the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, to pay the indebtedness of her husband to the plaintiff, and the making of some payments to the plaintiff, which were credited on the indebtedness of the deceased husband to the plaintiff, does not establish a novation, or release the liability of the estate to pay the unpaid residue of the plaintiff’s claim. The intent to release the original debtor from the whole of the claim is essential to a novation, and if that intent be lacking, novation cannot be justly claimed.
LENNON, P. J.
This action was brought to recover the sum of $908 upon a claim against the estate of Thomas Bros-nan, deceased, for merchandise Sold to him during his lifetime
[479]
by plaintiff. The trial was had with a jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $618. From the judgment and an order denying a new trial an appeal has been taken upon the judgment-roll and a bill of exceptions.
It was not error for the trial court to refuse to strike out all of the testimony of the defendant, Mary Brosnan, who was called as a witness for the plaintiff. The motion to strike out was not made until the witness had concluded her testimony and left the witness-stand. Ample opportunity was afforded counsel for the defendant, during the course of an extended direct and cross-examination of this witness, to object to her testimony had he so desired, but he failed to avail himself of the opportunity. He will not now be heard to complain that the testimony of the witness was objectionable; and as a motion to strike out evidence must be based upon a valid objection previously stated, the motion in the present case was properly denied.
(People
v.
Long,
43 Cal. 444;
People
v.
Rolfe,
61 Cal. 542;
People
v.
Samario,
84 Cal. 484, [24 Pac. 283];
In re Wax,
106 Cal. 347, [39 Pac. 624].)
The trial court of its own motion refused to permit a witness for the plaintiff to reply to a question upon cross-examination which plainly called for hearsay testimony. The point is now made that in the absence of an objection from plaintiff’s counsel it was error to exclude the answer. Ordinarily, it is the better and safer practice for the trial court to defer action upon the admission or rejection of evidence until a proper objection is made by the party interested in having the evidence excluded; but the trial court nevertheless is not compelled to hear and determine a cause, either in whole or in part, upon improper evidence; and in the exercise of its undoubted right to control and regulate the conduct of the trial, it may of its own motion rightfully refuse to receive evidence which is palpably incompetent.
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