People v. Cassou (1915) · DecisionDepot

People v. Cassou

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Court of Appeal Mar 22, 1915 No. Crim. No. 503.Published

Before: Lennon

Synopsis

APPEAL from a judgment of dismissal of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. George H. Cabaniss, Judge;

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

LENNON, P. J.

The defendant in this case, in an information filed in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, was charged with the felonious obtaining of personal property by false pretenses. The defendant’s demurrer was allowed upon the ground that the information did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. A judgment of dismissal was thereupon entered, from which the people have appealed.

The information charged • the defendant "with having induced one G. F. Vella, by means of false pretenses, to make and deliver to the defendant the following promissory note:

“$600. San Francisco, Cal., May 4, 1912.

“One day after date, 1912, at 3 o’clock

m. of that date (no grace) for value received in gold coin of the government of the United States, I promise to pay to the order of Bank of Italy in this city six hundred dollars, with interest from date at the rate of seven per cent per annum until paid, payable monthly, both principal and interest payable in like gold coin. (Signed) Basils Cassou.”

This note was indorsed by Vella, and following his signature as indorser appears the following:

“For value recived . . . hereby waive presentation, due protest, notice of protest and notice of nonpayment. (Signed) G. F. Vella.”

[25]

The information alleged that the note was of the value of six hundred dollars in gold coin of the United States, and that it was the personal property of Vella.

Section 532 of the Penal Code defines the offense of obtaining money, property, etc., by false pretenses; and that section, in so far as it is pertinent to the facts of the present case, reads as follows: “Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds another person of . . . property, . . . whether real or personal, ... is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for the larceny of the . . . property so obtained.”

An evidence of debt is personal property. (Pen. Code, sec. 7, subd. 12.)

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(italics are ours) ; and their payment by him, whoever was the holder at the time must have been for the use and benefit of the defendant for whose accommodation they were indorsed. The third count does not show that Filly ever paid the notes mentioned therein, or that Stone (the defendant) ever parted with them or put them in circulation, or that Filly ever suffered any inconvenience or loss in consequence of having signed them. For aught that appears they may have been immediately destroyed by Stone, or restored to Filly, or may now be in the hands of Stone, where they are incapable of being used to the prejudice of any of the parties to them. Our Revised Statutes . . . make it an offense in express terms to obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument by any false pretense, with intent to cheat or defraud another. Under this statute the offense is complete when the signature is obtained if it were obtained by false pretenses and with a fraudulent intent, although it may never be used to the prejudice of any person; but whether a note, where no use of it has been made, can be considered either as money or goods or chattels or a valuable thing may be questionable. It is, however, not important in this case as the objection has not been shown to exist in relation to the other two counts; and if any one count is good it is sufficient. That a note obtained by false pretenses and with a fraudulent intent, and which a party has actually used for his own benefit, is embraced within the spirit of the act as it stood before the Bevised Statutes, I have no doubt.” It will thus be seen that in the case last cited the court doubted that a promissory noto not used could be considered as within the category of money, goods, chattels, or valuable things, and inferentially held that an indorser of a promissory note could not be charged as such unless the note had been actually negotiated. To this extent at least the case under discussion frustrates rather than fortifies the contention of the people here. That the point upon which the indictment in the case last cited was held to be good can have no application to the statute of this state under which

Synopsis

LENNON, P. J.

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