Sutton v. Tanger

GRAY, J.,

pro

tem.

In the above-entitled actions, tried together before a jury, each respondent recovered a judgment for injuries received in a collision between an automobile operated by Dorothy Sutton and in which F. N. Almstead was a passenger, and another automobile, owned by appellant and operated by a renter. Appellant first contends that his demurrers to each complaint should have been sustained, because, while the facts pleaded show his

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liability under section 1714% of tlie Civil Code, such section violates the requirement of article I, section 11, of the state Constitution that all laws be uniform, by failing to be applicable to owners of horse-drawn vehicles. As broadly stated by him, this criticism is equally applicable to all the regulations of the California Vehicle Act, which have been repeatedly held constitutional in that regard.

(Matter of Application of Schuler,

167 Cal. 282 [Ann. Cas. 1915C, 706, 139 Pac. 685];

In re Schmolke,

199 Cal. 42 [248 Pac. 244];

Old Homestead Bakery, Inc.,

v.

Marsh,

75 Cal. App. 247 [242 Pac. 749].) More narrowly stated, the section does impose upon an automobile owner alone, a new liability analogous to the doctrine of

respondeat superior,

without the existence of the relationship of employment or agency or family and irrespective of negligence in ascertaining the competency of the driver. In

Buelke

v.

Levenstadt,

190 Cal. 684 [214 Pac. 42], section 24 of the California Vehicle Act, which imputes negligence of the minor to the person who signed his application for operator’s license, was held not violative of the above constitutional provision. "While it is true that an automobile may not itself be a dangerous instrumentality, yet, in the hands of an incompetent person, it may, under modern traffic conditions, become extremely dangerous to life, limb or property. The greater potential danger in case of a fast-moving automobile as compared to a slow-traveling horse-drawn vehicle warranted the legislature in placing its owner in a separate class by imposing this new liability upon him, effectively requiring him to ascertain at his peril, the competence of the borrower. A similar statute of the state of Michigan was held in