Young v. Board of Medical Examiners

HOUSER, J.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment rendered in favor" of respondent Board of Medical Examiners in a

certiorari

proceeding instituted for the purpose of reviewing and annulling an order made by said board whereby the license of appellant to practice medicine and surgery in the state of California was revoked.

The first point advanced by appellant as a reason why the judgment of the lower court should be reversed is that the complaint on which appellant was tried before the respondent board did not state facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the so-called Medical Act (Stats. 1913, p. 722, and amendments thereto). It is urged by appellant that,I whereas the charge against him in substance was that he was guilty of unprofessional conduct in that “he did use and employ advertising of medical business intended, and having a tendency, to deceive the public and impose upon credulous and ignorant persons in a manner harmful and injurious to public morals and safety”—as a matter of fact, as shown by the evidence, if appellant was at all guilty of the specific acts set forth in the complaint, such conduct did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Medical Act in question. With reference thereto, appellant directs particular attention, -first, to the language of the act which inhibits “all advertising of medical business. . . . ” (Subd. 3, sec. 14, Stats. 1913, p. 722.) Secondly, appellant adverts to the evidence adduced before the respondent board on a hearing of the charge, which in substance was to the effect that appellant was engaged in the false and fraudulent business of selling medical diplomas and other credentials from a medical college, proposed to be used by the purchaser thereof in obtaining for his use a necessary certificate or license to enable him to practice medicine and surgery in this state. More particularly, it is contended by appellant that the act, by whatever means of falsely and fraudulently furnishing to any person a spurious medical diploma for the purpose of enabling him to obtain a license to practice medi

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cine, did not amount to “advertising of medical business,” and consequently did not come within the purview of the statute.

That the means and method employed by appellant in procuring purchasers of spurious medical diplomas constituted “advertising” appears to be conceded; which leaves for determination the element of whether such practice was part of a “medical business.”