In Re Venable

THE COURT.

July 7, 1927, the petitioner was tried in the justice^ court on a charge of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. The trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury. On the 30th of that month he was released on bail. October 3d his sureties surrendered him into custody. On the same day he moved the justice’s court to dismiss the action on the ground that he had not been given a speedy trial. October 10th, on his application therefor, the supreme court issued a writ of

habeas corpus,

returnable before this court October 24th. On application of petitioner the matter was continued to Novem

[587]

ber 3d. October 14th the petitioner was again placed on trial and was convicted of the offense charged. He was thereupon sentenced to pay a fine of $225 or, in default of payment thereof, to be imprisoned in the county jail until satisfaction of the fine at the rate of one day for each dollar of the fine. He has not paid the fine and is now imprisoned in the county jail under the judgment of conviction.

It is clear that the commitment under which the petitioner was held at the time the writ therein was issued has become

functus officio

and it need not be further considered.

The petitioner is not entitled to his release by this proceeding unless the judgment of conviction is void. The fact that a defendant has not been given a speedy trial does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

(People

v.

Hawkins,

127 Cal. 372, 374 [59 Pac. 697].) Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss the action constitutes ground for 'reversal of the judgment on appeal therefrom is not a question before the court in this proceeding. It is sufficient to say that such denial is not a ground for petitioner’s release on

habeas corpus

from imprisonment under the judgment.