Crowl v. Board of Trustees

California Court of Appeal Oct 27, 1930 No. Docket No. 6406.Published

Before: Schmidt

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Holding. The court held that once a municipal corporation has attained a de facto status by exercising dominion over annexed territory, the validity of the annexation proceedings cannot be challenged via certiorari, but must instead be tested through quo warranto.

Issues

Whether a writ of certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge annexation proceedings after a municipal corporation has assumed dominion over the territory.
Whether the validity of a de facto municipal corporation's exercise of franchise may be challenged by private individuals rather than the state.

Disposition. Affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“after a de facto character has attached certiorari is not the proper remedy; that the proceedings must then be tested by quo warranto.”

“Certiorari to ministerial boards or officers is not the proper remedy to try . . . the right to exercise corporate functions. Quo warranto is the only remedy which affords complete relief.”

“Being a de facto corporation, the general rule is that none but the state can call its existence in question.”

SCHMIDT, J.,

pro tem.

The appeal in this case is from a judgment entered in the lower court following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, to a petition in

certiorari,

seeking to review the acts and proceedings of the Board of Trustees of the city of Southgate in annexing to said city of Southgate certain territory known as the fifth addition to the city of Southgate.

The facts alleged in the petition show that all of the steps for annexation required by the annexation act of 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 587, and amendments thereto) have been taken, including the passing of “an ordinance declaring the result of the election and approving the annexation . . . and it is hereby ordered that a certified copy of this ordinance giving the date of its passage under the seal of said City of Southgate be submitted to and filed with the Secretary of State of California from and after the date of which filing the annexation of said territory to the City of South-gate shall be deemed to be complete and thenceforth said annexed territory shall be to all intents and purposes a part of the City of Southgate”. The petition is silent as to whether the certified copy of the ordinance had been filed with the Secretary of State. We must presume that the city clerk of Southgate performed his official duty and that therefore same has been filed with the Secretary of State.

The petition was filed after the city of Southgate assumed to exercise dominion over the annexed lands. The demurrer filed in the lower court was both general and special and by the demurrer it was urged, among other matters, that the proceedings for annexation involved could not be reviewed on a writ of

certiorari,

but that it was necessary to test their validity by a writ of

quo warranto.

An examination of the authorities shows that after all the steps for annexation have been taken, even though there may be some irregularity therein, the municipal corporation exercises dominion over the annexed lands in at least a

de facto

capacity. The authorities hold that before such

de facto

character has attached, that

Crowl v. Board of Trustees

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SCHMIDT, J.,

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