Craycroft v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal May 3, 1912 No. Civ. No. 1119.Published

Before: Allen

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that the 1911 amendment to section 3499 of the Political Code operates retroactively to divest the superior court of jurisdiction over land purchase contests initiated more than five years after the issuance of a certificate of purchase. Consequently, a writ of prohibition is appropriate to prevent the trial court from proceeding in a matter where it lacks jurisdiction.

Issues

Whether the 1911 amendment to section 3499 of the Political Code applies retroactively to divest the superior court of jurisdiction over land contests.
Whether a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy when the trial court lacks jurisdiction despite the availability of an appeal.

Disposition. granted

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A court that proceeds in the trial of a cause against the express prohibition of a statute is exceeding its jurisdiction, and may be prevented from doing so by prohibition from this court.”

Synopsis

State School Lands—Limitation of Time for Contest—ITve Tears from Issuance of Certificate.—Under the provisions of section 3499 of the Political Code, as amended March 13, 1911, the superior court is divested of jurisdiction to hear and determine a contest for state lands, unless such contest shall be filed, heard, determined, referred or allowed, within five years from and after the date on which such certificate of purchase may have been issued.

Id.—Code Amendment Retroactive.—The provisions of section 3499 of Political Code as amended in 1911 are expressly made applicable to all cases; and there is a clearly expressed intention that that section should act retroactively, and bar all previously issued certificates unless heard and determined within five years from the date of the issuance of the certificate. The mere application to purchase, without payment of money, vests no rights in the applicant, and that section cannot be said to impair the obligation of any contract, or to be destructive of any vested rights or interests.

Id.—Want of Jurisdiction of Superior Court—Prohibition—Remedy by Appeal—Adequacy-—Discretion of Prohibiting Court.—Since the superior court is divested of jurisdiction to hear and determine a contest of a certificate of purchase after the lapse of five years from its daite, a writ of prohibition will lie to restrain it from exercising such jurisdiction, notwithstanding a possible remedy by appeal from its judgment without jurisdiction. The question whether, such remedy is adequate is matter within -the sound discretion of the court granting the writ.

ALLEN, P. J.

It appears from the verified petition filed herein that on the third day of October, 1901, the register of the state land office at Visalia, upon the payment of twenty per cent of the purchase price and interest, issued to one Samuel Brown a certificate of purchase for. a certain section of school land then owned by the state and subject to sale; that on the day ensuing Brown transferred and set over said certificate to petitioner; that said certificate was duly recorded; that petitioner has made payment in full to the state for said land and all interest, taxes and costs of every kind, nature and description; that thereafter on October 6, 1910, one Kerr filed his application with the surveyor general, contesting the application of said Brown to purchase the said land, with a demand that the conflicting claims be referred for adjudication; that on the same day an order was entered by the surveyor general referring the contest of Kerr and Brown to the superior court of Kern county for trial and adjudication; that on November 3d Robert L. Perry made application to purchase the north half of said section, contesting also the purchase rights of Brown; that on November 10th one Spencer made' application to purchase the north half of said section. That neither said Kerr nor said Brown, within sixty days after the order of reference, commenced any action in the superior court of Kern county with reference to said adjudication; that on December 7, 1910, one Chittenden filed his application for the purchase of the whole of said section, contesting the rights of all parties before named, and asking that the conflicting claims be referred to the superior court; that on December 7, 1910, after the filing of such application by said Chittenden, Kerr filed his application to purchase all

[783]

of said section, together also with another contest and protest against the application of Brown; that on December 31, 1910, one Charles Smithwick filed his application for the purchase of the south half of said section. That on the thirteenth day of January, 1911, an order was made by the said state surveyor • general and the register of the state land office, as follows: “It is therefore ordered and directed, that the contest as set forth between the above-named R. D. Chittenden and Samuel Brown, be and the same is hereby referred, together with the conflicting claims of John P. Kerr, Robert L. Perry, Richard V. Dorsey, Charles Smithwick and Emmet L. Spencer, and of each of them, to the Superior Court in and for the County of Kern, State of California, for adjudication.” That none of the applications of contesting claimants have ever been allowed or approved in any manner by the surveyor general, and that neither of said parties has paid any portion of the purchase price of the land referred to; that thereafter, on February 21, 1911, an action was commenced in the superior court of Kern county by Emmet L. Spencer against Brown and the other claimants, based upon the order of reference above referred to, praying for an adjudication that the application of said Brown be held illegal and void, and that the certificate of purchase so assigned and held by petitioner be likewise held illegal and void, and that Spencer’s application be adjudged and declared a valid application for the purchase of said land; that thereafter petitioner demurred to the complaint and moved to dismiss said action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, which said demurrer and motion to dismiss were overruled and denied. It is averred that the said superior court intends to and will, unless restrained by this writ of prohibition, proceed to the trial of said action and thus impose upon petitioner great costs and expense in the defense thereof; that the court has been divested of jurisdiction to hear and determine said action; that petitioner is a laboring man without means, and in order to properly present his defense it will be necessary, at great expense, to bring witnesses from a distance; that such trial will occupy many days or weeks, at much expense; that said land is of little value, except for the oil which it contains and such value is problematical; and accordingly this writ of prohibition is prayed for.

Craycroft v. Superior Court

AI Brief

Synopsis

ALLEN, P. J.

More from California Court of Appeal

Related research

AI Brief