Bridgford v. McAdoo

NOURSE, J.

as director-general of railroads, appeals from a judgment rendered against him and in favor of plaintiff for $1,078.32, the proceeds of a check belonging

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to plaintiff and issued by the paymaster of the quartermaster’s department of the war department. The facts of the case found to be true by the trial court are: On September 18, 1917, one Lawrence entered into a contract with the United States, acting through its war department, for the delivery of 2,500 cords of wood to the department at' Camp Fremont, in San Mateo County. On January 16, 1918, Lawrence entered into a contract with respondent whereby respondent agreed to advance money to Lawrence from time to time to assist him in the performance of his contract with the government, and Lawrence assigned to respondent all moneys, vouchers, and checks issued under said contract and authorized respondent to collect and receive the same. Subsequent to said assignment Lawrence delivered at Camp Fremont wood of the agreed price of more than $2,200 and fully prepaid all freight thereon with moneys advanced to him by respondent for that purpose, and there is still due and owing to respondent from Lawrence on account of said advances a sum in excess of $2,200. On the second day of August, 1918, an officer of the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (then operating under the appellant as director-general of railroads), with full knowledge of respondent’s right and claim to the money due under said contract, accompanied Lawrence to the office of the paymaster of the War Department, and, over the protests of respondent, aided Lawrence in procuring from the paymaster a check for $1,078.32, a portion of the amount due under said contract, and at the same time received the check from Lawrence, which was then delivered to appellant, who ever since has retained the check or its proceeds in his said capacity as director-general of railroads.

[1]

The only point raised by appellant is that it does not appear but that Lawrence was at all times willing to repay respondent all the money advanced to him and that it does not appear that respondent ever made demand therefor upon Lawrence. Neither fact is essential to recovery in this action. The check and its proceeds were the property of respondent by reason of the assignment. The appellant and his agents, with full knowledge of the title and claim of respondent, having wrongfully secured the check, wrongfully detained possession thereof. The appellant thereby became an involuntary trustee under section 2223