People v. Hrjak

CRAIG, J.

On February 10, 1927, a complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of Temescal township, in the county of Riverside, charging the appellant with having committed

“the

crime of misdemeanor, to wit, the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor,” in the city of Corona, Riverside County, on or about February 9, 1927. The jus

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tice of the peace thereupon issued a warrant for appellant’s arrest, and on the same date he was apprehended, brought into the justice’s court, pleaded not guilty, and his preliminary examination was had on February 15, 1927. After hearing the evidence the justice of the peace of Temescal township found “that there is not sufficient evidence upon which to hold the defendant, George Harjack, and it is ordered that the defendant be discharged,” and appellant' was released. On February 16, 1927, another complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of Riverside township, in said county, wherein appellant was charged with having manufactured intoxicating liquor in the county of Riverside on or about February 10, 1927. He was arrested, posted cash bail in the sum of five hundred dollars, and on March 10, 1927, a preliminary examination was held, and the last-mentioned justice of the peace made and entered an order reciting, in part, “that from the evidence presented it appears that the offense charged has been committed, and there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. He will therefore be held for trial in the superior court of this county. ’ ’ Thereafter the case was tried before a jury in the superior court. The defendant’s personal appearance was waived, evidence was introduced, and a verdict of guilty was returned, and judgment was entered accordingly. Appellant failing to appear his bail was forfeited, and a bench warrant was issued, during the deliberations of the jury. The defendant appealed from the verdict and judgment, and attacks various steps taken by both the justice’s court of Riverside township and the superior court, but the principal ground requiring attention here, and which was strenuously urged at the second preliminary, and during the trial, is that of alleged former jeopardy. Stating the proposition in the appellant’s own language as presented in his briefs, it is insisted “that the defendant had a hearing of the same identical charge, and was discharged, for insufficient evidence, and subsequently was re-arrested, tried and convicted of said identical charge,” and that the superior court “denied the defendant’s offer to prove that he had been once in jeopardy and that he had been acquitted.”