Ronning v. Way
Before: Shaw
Synopsis
Action for Conversion of Mortgaged Personal Property by Constable— Notice Before Sale — Pleading — Cause op Action Stated.—A complaint in an action by a mortgagee of personal property situated in Los Angeles county, and mortgaged by a resident of Biverside county, which alleges that it was recorded in Los Angeles county only, that defendant, who is a constable in a specified township in the latter county, converted said mortgaged property by levying upon and selling the same, without paying or tendering to plaintiff the amount of the debt due to plaintiff, the payment of which was secured by said mortgage, that the value of the mortgaged property so converted was the sum of $600; an£ that prior to the sale and conversion of said personal property the plaintiff informed defendant of the existence of said chattel mortgage, and the claim of the plaintiff thereunder, states a cause of action, and a general demurrer thereto was properly overruled.
Id.—Effect of Failure to Becord Chattel Mortgage in Mortgagor’s County—Qualified Invalidity—Pleading Bequired by Defendant.—The failure of the mortgagor to record the chattel mortgage in the county of his residence, as expressly required by section 2959 of the Civil Code, when taken in connection with section 2957 thereof, renders the chattel mortgage void “as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and subsequent encumbrancers of the property in good faith for value.” It is held that, as these enumerated classes do not appear to include the defendant, he is not in a position, without pleading the fact, to avail himself of the benefit thereof.
Id.—Construction of Code Provisions as to Chattel Mortgages— Modification of Former Provisions.—Although the chattel mortgage in question comprised personal property not specified in section 2955 of the Civil Code as subject thereto, and although the mortgagor failed to record it in the county of his residence, as provided in sections 2957 and 2959 of the same code, yet each of those sections is qualified by the later provisions of section 2973 of the Civil Code, adopted in 1905, providing that “mortgages of personal property other than that mentioned in section 2955, and mortgages not made in conformity with the provisions of this article, are nevertheless valid between the parties, their heirs and assigns, and personal representatives, and persons who, before parting with value, have actual notice thereof.”
Id.—Insufficient Defense to Action for Conversion—Levy and Sale-Against Vendee of Mortgagor—Bona Fide Purchase for Value not Alleged.—An alleged defense to the complaint, in the action for conversion, that the levy and sale by the constable defendant was against a vendee of the mortgagor, as the oiyner of the property mortgaged, which fails to aver that such vendee was a purchaser in good faith and for value, is insufficient. Under section 2957 of the Civil Code, to render the mortgage void as against such vendee, it must appear by allegation, proof and finding that the purchase was in good faith and for value, and in the absence thereof, the position of the vendee with reference to the property is identical with that of the vendor.
SHAW, J.
This is an action to recover damages against the defendant as constable for an alleged wrongful conversion of property mortgaged to plaintiff.
The court gave judgment for plaintiff, from which, and an order denying his motion for a new trial, defendant prosecutes this appeal.
[529]
The complaint alleges the execution to plaintiff of a mortgage upon certain personal property, situated at Whittier, in Los Angeles county, by one George A. Gray, a resident of Riverside county; that the mortgage was recorded in Los Angeles county
only;
that defendant on May 15, 1909, converted the mortgaged property by levying upon and selling the same without paying or tendering to plaintiff the amount of the debt due to plaintiff, payment of which was secured by said mortgage; that the value of the mortgaged property so converted by defendant was the sum of $600. It was further alleged “that prior to the sale and conversion of the personal property herein referred to the plaintiff informed the defendant of the existence of said chattel mortgage and the claim of the plaintiff thereunder.”
Appellant contends that the court erred in overruling a general demurrer interposed to the complaint. This contention is based upon the claim, first, that the property covered by the mortgage was other than that specified in section 2955, Civil Code, and therefore not subject to mortgage; and, second, that the complaint shows that at the time of the execution of the mortgage the mortgagor resided in Riverside county in this state, and that no record of the mortgage was made in said county as required by section 2959, Civil Code ; that by reason of such failure to so record the mortgage it was void under the provisions of section 2957, Civil Code, which provides that “A mortgage of personal property is void as against creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the property in good faith and for value, unless: ... 2. It is acknowledged or proved, certified, and recorded in like manner as grants of real property.” Under this provision, the failure to record the mortgage in Riverside county rendered it void as. to two classes of persons only; that is, creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers in good faith and for value. Since, however, it does not appear that defendant belonged to either of these enumerated classes, he is not in a position, without pleading the fact, to avail himself of the benefit thereof.
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