In Re Johnson
Before: Prewett
Synopsis
PROCEEDING on Habeas Corpus to secure the release of a lawyer imprisoned for failure to pay a license tax.
The facts are stated in. the opinion of the court.
PREWETT, P. J.,
pro
tem.
The petitioner was convicted under section 1 of Ordinance No. 188 of the city of Marysville, and he seeks his discharge from the imprison
[466]
ment which followed such conviction. Section 1 requires that every person carrying on certain specified callings shall, before commencing the same, procure a license therefor, and section 80, so far as pertinent to this inquiry, reads as follows: “Section 80. Every person engaged in business as a lawyer,
maintaining - an office in said city,
shall pay a license of $2.50 per month. ’ ’ The petitioner, a lawyer by occupation, maintains an office in said city and he neglected to take out the license demanded by said section 1. No point is made as to sufficiency of the judgment in mere matters of form.
(1) It is contended that the ordinance in question is regulatory in its nature and therefore beyond the powers of the municipality. It is conceded that the business in question is not one that can be “regulated” under the police powers of cities and counties. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is a revenue measure, it cannot be upheld.
[1]
The title of the ordinance is cited to the court as an evidence that the municipality, in adopting the ordinance, intended it as a regulatory provision. The title reads: “An ordinance providing for licensing and regulating the carrying on of certain professions, trades, callings and occupations.” It is true that this title contains the word “regulating,” but this is not conclusive. The court will look to the substantive provisions of the ordinance to determine its legal effect. It happens that this title is copied in precise words from that considered by the court in
Ex parte Braun,
141 Cal. 204, [74 Pac. 780]. The court, in arriving at the conclusion that the ordinance considered in that ease was for revenue and not for regulation, uses the following language: “It is devoid of regulating provisions, being devoted entirely to the imposition of a license tax'upon various trades and occupations, and the collection thereof. It imposes a license tax upon a great majority of callings and occupations and, in several instances, the amount of the tax is based upon the amount of business transacted. It includes numerous callings which are in no degree subject to regulation. . . . Taking into consideration the absence of regulatory provisions, the amounts of the several taxes imposed and the nature of many of the subjects of taxation named in the ordinance, including the particular business here involved, it is very clear that the license tax upon the business
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