Southern California Edison Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
Before: Houser
HOUSER, J.
It appears that some time during the year-1917, in the state of Idaho, one Claude S. McKendrick, who at that time was a resident of this state, was divorced by his wife. By the decree of divorce the custody of Daniel McKendrick, a minor son of the parties, was awarded to the mother, although no provision for alimony to her, nor support by the father for the son, was contained in the decree. A few months after the decree of divorce was granted the mother of the boy was married to a man named Rodgers. On June 23, 1923, in the course of his industrial employment, the father of the boy met with an accident which resulted in his death; and thereafter in pursuance of an application to the respondent Commission for adjustment of compensation, an order of award was made in favor of the minor son as a dependent of the deceased.. Upon such basic facts petitioner seeks a review of the proceedings had before the respondent Commission.
An examination of the record herein develops further material facts as follows: At the time when the divorce was granted the son Daniel was a small boy. Thereafter, up to about a year preceding the death of his father, he lived with his grandparents in a small town in the state of Idaho and there attended school, following which, for a period of about one year, he lived in said state with his mother and his stepfather on a ranch—during all of which time the father sent to his son various amounts of cash, aggregating approximately $50 per year, besides miscellaneous items of clothing.
[357]
However, the boy was not wholly dependent upon his father for support. When money was received by him, if not immediately needed for the purpose of purchasing necessary clothing, etc., it was placed in a savings bank account which, at the time of the hearing before the commission, showed a credit of approximately $185, which included $100 received from the sale of two Liberty bonds of the face value of $50 each, one of which had been given to the boy by his father and the other by his mother. While it appeared that, with the exception of an interest in an unsettled estate of the value of $1,000 owned by the stepfather, neither he nor the mother of the boy was possessed of any means or property of any sort, nevertheless they were willing to provide for the boy’s support and give him such care and maintenance as lay within their power; but that “at the present time” they were financially unable to provide for his education; “his father said he would look out for his education, and for that he was dependent upon his father—for an education.” The stepfather was “just working” on his father’s ranch; had no charge “of the selling or income of the ranch,” and received no salary. As testified by him, “Dad does all that . . . I get all I want to eat; clothing and a home—ought to be satisfied these days with that much. ’ ’ On the other hand, at the time the decree of divorce was granted to the mother of the boy the father agreed to help take care of his son. Regarding that matter, in part the mother testified:
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