People v. Harrison

Criminal Law—Lewd and Lascivious Acts With Boy—Sufficient Information—Conjunctive Pleading—Single Offense.—An information charging the defendant, in the language of the statute, conjunctively, with the offense of willfully and lewdly committing certain described lewd and lascivious acts upon and with the body and private parts and members of a boy named under fourteen years of age, with the intent to arouse the passions of the child and of the defendant, states but one offense. The commission of any or all of the acts described in, and with the intent stated by, the statute constitutes but one and the same crime or offense, and not different offenses. A demurrer to the information on the ground that more than one offense was charged in one count was properly overruled.

Id.—Evidence—Previous Acts of Sodomy—Result of Aroused Passions—Intent as to Offense Charged.—Evidence was admissible to show that, prior to the commission of the offense charged, acts of sodomy had been committed by the boy with the defendant, after the déíendant had committed lascivious acts with the private members of the boy, which aroused his sexual passions, so that sodomy was the resulting act, and that these several acts in each case were connected and inseparable. Such evidence would tend to show what the purpose and intent of the defendant was on the occasion charged in the information, and was competent for that purpose.

Id.—Instructions as to Accomplice—Rule as to Young Boy.—The instructions as to an accomplice were correct in law as to an adult accomplice, but were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to, since the boy was thirteen years of age, and the instruction might well have contained the statement of section 26 of the Penal Code, providing that children under the age of fourteen are incapable of committing crimes, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them they knew of its wrongfulness.

Id.—Request Properly Refused—Matter of Pact—Difficult Proof of Charge.—An instruction asked by defendant, that charges like the one made against defendant were easy to make and hard to prove, was not an instruction as to matter of law required to be given by the court to the jury.

Id.—Immaterial Variance in Name—Idem Sonans.—Where the information charged that the improper acts were committed with a boy named “William Strandberg,” and the proof showed that the boy’s name was “William Elmer'Standberg,” the variance is not sufficient to vitiate the judgment. These names were so similar as to make the' doctrine of idem sonans applicable.

Id.—Misconduct of Jury not Shown—Note to Jury Stating Death —Prejudice not Presumed.—The mere fact that while the jury were deliberating on their verdict a card was handed in stating “Aunt Sophia is dead,” and that shortly thereafter they agreed upon their verdict, does not establish misconduct of the jury, where it was not shown from what source the card came, or for whom it was intended, or that it had any effect upon the minds of the jury or any of its members, or that it tended to induce an agreement upon the verdict. In the absence of such showing, no' prejudice can be presumed to have resulted to defendant.