In Re Travers
Before: Brittain, Nourse
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Opinion — Brittain
BRITTAIN, J.
On the petition of her attorney, a writ of
habeas corpus
in this matter was made returnable to this court. The petition, which was lengthy, and need not be set forth, was based upon the alleged facts that Evelyn Travers was imprisoned by the health officer of the city and county of San Francisco, in a certain ward of the city and county hospital, on the pretense that she was infected with a certain specific disease, that she was not examined by a licensed physician, and that she was examined against her consent. It was further alleged that she was arrested while on her way to her home, without warrant or cause, by a peace officer, that she was discharged by the police court on the following morning, and that she was examined by a doctor while she was under duress produced by threats that she would be convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to the county jail unless she consented to the examination. It was alleged also that she was not suffering from the particular disease mentioned in the petition nor from any other contagious or infectious disease, that the state board of health nor its secretary had not taken control of the case, nor caused her restraint in the hospital to prevent the spread of such disease, that she had been- deprived of nourishing food, access to the sunshine, and of the visits of her friends and attorney.
[766]
[1]
On the return of the writ by the health officer of the municipality, who is also an inspector of the state board of health, most of the allegations of fact were traversed, and other facts set forth as a justification for the detention. Because of the wide divergence of the two statements of fact it became necessary for evidence to be taken. The matter was referred to Thos. F. Prendergast, a commissioner appointed by the court. The proceedings before the commissioner were reported by the official reporter of the court. No good result would follow from even summarizing either the evidence or the report of the commissioner. Suffice it to say that the examination was continued at great length. A large number of witnesses testified and documentary evidence was introduced. The testimony of medical experts on the part of the respondent was direct and positive concerning the infection of the woman by two distinct, infectious and communicable diseases most frequently transmitted through participation in social vice. The evidence of medical witnesses called on behalf of the petitioner was to the effect that when they made examinations the recognized tests failed to show the presence of the specific diseases in question. There was unquestionable evidence that by certain preliminary treatments the tests in cases of admitted infection might be rendered negative of proof for a short period during which an examination might have been made. The court is of the opinion that the finding of the commissioner that the two forms of disease in question were present at the time of the issuance of the writ is sustained by the evidence and is conclusive; and there is no evidence that either has been eradicated since that time.
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)