Inman v. L. E. White Lumber Co.
Before: Burnett
Synopsis
Action by Plaintiffs as Individuals—Written Contract—Sale of Redwood Ties—Recovery of Balance Due—Evidence of Partnership.—In an action by two plaintiffs in their individual capacity to recover a balance due for the sale and delivery of redwood ties to the lumber company defendant, under a written contract with them as individuals, where judgment was recovered according to the terms of such contract, evidence that the money recovered was due to them as copartners cannot avail to overthrow the judgment so rendered.
Id.—Evidence of Special Partnership—Money Partner—Title of One Partner to Ties—Parties, —Where the evidence shows that by agreement between the plaintiffs, one of them was to furnish the supplies for the camp and the money to carry on the business which was to be the source of his profits, and the other plaintiff was to have charge of getting out the ties, which were to be the product of his timber, and that he was to receive the entire profit from the ties themselves, in this view of -the matter, the action could have been brought by him alone, but since the written contract was made with both of them, as individuals, it was proper that both should join in the action.
Id.—Absence of Special Demurrer.—If it be conceded that the money partner was improperly joined as coplaintiff, the remedy was by special demurrer and in the absence of such demurrer no possible prejudice could result to defendant by the joinder.
Id.—Judgment a Bar to Further Relief.—The judgment is a bar to any suit that might be brought by either of the plaintiffs for the same cause of action.
Id.—Objection to Evidence of Partnership Nullified by Assignments.—The objection on account of the evidence of a partnership claim, if meritorious, is nullified by assignments introduced in evidence, by one of which all the credits standing to their account were transferred with the assent of the defendant to the one who furnished the money, and by another of which such assignee assigned an undivided half interest in all such credits to the co-plaintiff individually.
Id.—Ties Delivered in Excess of Maximum Stated in Contract —Acceptance—Obligation Under Contract.—Though defendant could not be compelled to accept any ties in excess of the maximum stated in the written contract, yet when an excess was delivered and accepted by the defendant, the court was justified in holding that all of the extra ties were delivered under the contract at the contract price, and that defendant assumed the corresponding obligation to pay for the same at the price stipulated in the contract, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Id.—Reasonable Value of Extra Ties—Contract Price as Evidence. The plaintiffs were at least entitled to receive the reasonable value of the extra ties accepted, and in the absence of any other proof of reasonable value, the contract price is controlling as evidence thereof.
BURNETT, J.
The action was to recover $2,585, the balance due, for the sale and delivery of redwood ties at fifty cents apiece. The court found, upon sufficient evidence, that “said plaintiffs sold and delivered to said defendant at said defendant’s special instance and request 24,473 split and hewn merchantable redwood railroad ties; that said ties were eight feet in length and six inches by eight inches in size ; that said ties were delivered to and received and accepted by said defendant at its flume near Rollerville, in the county of Mendocino; that said defendant agreed to pay said plaintiffs fifty cents for each of said ties so delivered; that said defendant became indebted to said plaintiffs in the sum of $12,286.50 on account of said ties so delivered; that said defendant paid to said plaintiffs for and on account of said
[553]
ties so delivered the sum of $9,651.50 and no more.” The judgment thereupon followed in favor of plaintiffs for the balance due.
The main reliance of appellant seems to be upon the claim that “The evidence fails to show that the plaintiffs Inman and Foster were jointly entitled to recover any sum whatever from defendant, the evidence showing affirmatively that any sum or amount which might be due was due to the firm of Inman -and Foster, a copartnership.” But if we concede the soundness of appellant’s statement of the legal proposition involved, it cannot avail to overthrow the judgment. This follows from the consideration that there was evidence that the transaction was not with any partnership, but with plaintiffs in their individual capacity. The testimony of Mr. Foster is to the effect that he was to furnish the supplies for the camps and the money necessary to carry on the business, and this was to be the source of his profit, but that Mr. Inman was to have charge of the getting out of the ties, that they were the products of his own timber, and that In-man was to receive the entire profit from the ties themselves. In this view of the matter the action could have been brought by Inman alone, but since the written contract was made with Inman and Foster as individuals it was at least proper that both should join in the action. It is at least entirely clear that if Foster was improperly joined as a party the remedy was by special demurrer and no possible prejudice has been suffered by defendant. The judgment is certainly, a bar to any suit that might be brought by either of the plaintiffs for the same cause of action.
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