Neiswender v. E. B. Campbell

WARD, J.,

pro tem.

The complaint in this action alleged an agreement under the terms of which plaintiff was to procure for defendants the necessary finances to drill an oil-well or to procure a responsible party or parties so to do. In May, 1927, defendant E. B. Campbell was the owner in fee simple of a lot situated on State Street in Los Angeles County which will be referred to as lot No. 1. Among other properties, Campbell had a half interest as lessee in the property designated as lot No. 8 several blocks away on Obispo Street. The other half interest as lessee belonged to defendant P. M. Reidy. At the time mentioned in the complaint the Obispo well on lot No. 8 had been drilled to the depth of about 3,500 feet. In May, 1927, through a mutual friend, Campbell met appellant and authorized him to secure financing to the extent of fifty per cent of the money required to drill a well on State Street lot, No. 1. Campbell was to furnish steam, pipe, etc. Appellant was to be paid an amount equal to one-sixth of twenty per cent of the so-called land owner’s royalty reserved by Campbell.

[506]

Appellant introduced Campbell to representatives of the Rich-field Consolidated Oil Company. After several conversations relative to lot No. 1, further negotiations were dropped as to that particular parcel of land and the Richfield Company entered into a contract with all of the defendants to finance to the extent of $15,000 the drilling on lot No. 8. This contract is claimed to have been the proximate result of appellant’s efforts, but the trial court upon this issue held with the defendants.

Appellant contends that the evidence shows that during the pendency of the negotiations inaugurated by appellant defendant Campbell revamped the deal by skilfully guiding the Richfield representative from State Street to the Obispo property and by substituting one lot for the other; that while the original agreement between appellant and Campbell was relative to lot No. 1, that Campbell really intended to interest the Richfield Company in lot No. 8 and thereby defraud appellant. This contention can only be based upon suspicion and surmise. Campbell exhibited the Obispo and other property to the Richfield representatives, but the first notification that Richfield was not interested in lot No. 1 came from the Richfield representatives and likewise the suggestion to deal with Campbell in an agreement to finance lot No. 8. There is some evidence that if the Richfield representatives did not like lot No. 1 that perhaps they would be interested in going in on some other location and that the same commission arrangement would apply on other locations. The circumstances surrounding the transaction do not bear out the last-mentioned contention. The trial court’s finding upon this subject cannot be disturbed in wiew of substantial evidence supporting it.