Bagnall v. Travelers Insurance
Before: Spence
SPENCE, J.
Plaintiff sought to recover the benefits to which he claimed to be entitled under the disability provisions of three life insurance policies. Upon a triál by the court sitting without a jury judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff, from which judgment defendant appeals.
On July 19, 1926, plaintiff became totally disabled as the result of a disease known as hyper-thyroidism and remained so totally disabled from that date until February 14, 1927. Plaintiff returned to work on February 15th and was not totally disabled thereafter. The court found that “plaintiff became wholly disabled by a disease and was prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation or employment for wages or profit for a period of more than three consecutive
[716]
months, to-wit, from July 19, 1926, to February 14, 1927 ... ”; that “said disease was of such a nature that such total disability might have been and was likely to have been permanent and have continued for life”; and that “during said period, due proof of a claim under said policies that such disability would be permanent and continue for life, was pending”. . Thereupon the court awarded plaintiff disability benefits under the policies covering the period from July 19, 1926, to February 14, 1927.
The main question presented on this appeal involves the construction of the disability provisions of the policies. Appellant contends that recovery under the policies depends upon due proof of a disability which is both total and permanent.
The disability provisions of the three policies were the same and the following paragraphs contained in all three of the policies will be numbered to facilitate reference thereto.
(1) “Upon due proof that . . . the insured has become wholly disabled by bodily injuries or disease and will be continuously and wholly prevented thereby for life from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit, the company will waive the payment of any premiums which may fall due on this contract during such disability and will pay from the commencement of such disability and during its continuance the disability income stated on the first page of this contract. ...”
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