Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission

THOMPSON (IRA F.), J.

By this proceeding it is sought to annul an order of the Industrial Accident Commission dated February 29, 1932. Joseph Elbert Huston was injured July 26, 1928, during the course of his employment with the petitioner, which corporation was at the time self-insured. The petitioner paid compensation to Huston at the rate of $20.83 per week at all times subsequent to one week following the accident, together with all hospital and medical expenses. However, on May 14, 1930, Huston filed an application asking for an adjustment of his claim, alleging that his injuries were caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of his employer, the petitioner. After a hearing thereon the respondent Commission determined that the accident was occasioned by the serious and wilful misconduct and ordered the compensation increased by one-half. Upon the petition of the employer, however, a rehearing was granted and the Commission arrived at a different conclusion. The respondent Huston then petitioned for a rehearing, which was denied, following which order he petitioned this court for a writ of review, which was denied, and the award became final. Subsequently and on November 5, 1931, he filed with the Commission a petition that his case be reopened upon the ground of a mistake of fact which he could establish by additional evidence to be produced at the hearing. Over the strenuous objections of petitioner the Commission heard the evidence and made its order reopening the case and determining that the accident was caused by the misconduct, ordering the compensation increased to $31.24 weekly, or one-half,

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beginning August 5, 1928. It is this award which the petitioner claims the respondent Commission had no jurisdiction to render. The principal contention in this particular is that section 20 (d) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Stats. 1917, pp. 831, 850) does not apply to cases involving “proof” of serious and wilful misconduct, and hence that the decision made after the rehearing became final and beyond the power of the respondent Commission to alter or amend.

The section referred to reads as follows: “(d) The commission shall have continuing jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions and awards made and entered under the provisions of sections 6 to 31, inclusive, of this act and may at any time, upon notice and after opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, rescind, alter or amend any such order, decision or award made by it upon good cause appearing therefor, such power including the right to review, grant or regrant, diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits prescribed by this act, any compensation awarded, upon the grounds that the disability of the person in whose favor such award was made has either recurred, increased, diminished or terminated; provided, that no award of compensation shall be rescinded, altered or amended after two hundred forty-five weeks from the date of the injury. Any order, decision or award rescinding, altering or amending a prior order, decision or award shall have the same effect as is herein provided for original orders, decisions or awards. ”