Shurtleff v. Wynns
Before: Barnard
BARNARD, P. J.
This is an action for damages on account of personal injuries received by the plaintiff in a collision between two automobiles, which occurred in the city of Los Angeles on the thirtieth day of October, 1926. The plaintiff, who is a physician, was on his way to make a professional call and was riding, accompanied by his wife, in a Chandler sedan automobile owned by him and driven by his son Fred L. Shurtleff. As they were pro
[655]
eeeding in an easterly direction on Tenth Street, the defendant, Annie Wynns, accompanied by her young son, was traveling in a southerly direction on Westchester Place. The two cars came into collision at the intersection of these two streets, resulting in the injuries complained of. An answer was filed by B. Wynns alone, and the case was tried by the court without a jury. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, from which this appeal was taken.
It is contended that any finding of negligence on the part of the appellant would be contrary to the fair import of the evidence. While it is admitted that the testimony of the witnesses is conflicting in regard to any such negligence, appellant earnestly insists that the supposed negligence of appellant could not have been predicated upon any other theory than excessive speed, and that the position of the cars after the accident, and the fact that the two occupants of appellant’s car were only slightly injured, conclusively shows, in spite of any evidence to the contrary, that appellant was not traveling too fast. There was evidence that the front end of appellant’s automobile struck the rear end of respondent’s car; that appellant’s car was turned completely around and stopped facing in the direction from which it had been coming, although the point on Westchester Place where it stopped does not appear; and that it had a broken windshield, the front bumper torn off and the front part of the radiator smashed. Respondent’s car swerved to the southeasterly corner of the intersection, struck the curb, swerved to about the middle of Tenth Street and tipped over. There was evidence that the appellant entered the intersection “at a tremendous rate of speed”, or, as testified to by some of the witnesses, at from thirty to forty miles an hour; that she was traveling on her left-hand side of the road; and there was also evidence which justifies the conclusion that the appellant failed to yield the right of way, and that the respondent was entitled thereto under the law then existing. While the evidence as to excessive speed was alone sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence, the operation of the car on the left-hand side of the highway itself constituted negligence
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