Kelley v. Long
Before: Hart
Synopsis
Landlord and Tenant—Bule as to Forcible Eviction from Substantial Part of Premises Inapplicable to Insignificant Part.—The rule that if a tenant is forcibly evicted by the landlord from a substantial part of the demised premises, and the lease is not terminated, there can be no apportionment of rent, and the tenant cannot be compelled to pay the rent reserved, and that an actual ouster is not necessary to constitute an eviction, since any act of the lessor which results in depriving the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of. the premises will constitute an eviction, does not apply when it does not appear that the interference has resulted in depriving the lessee of a substantial, as distinguished from an insignificant or inconsequential, portion of the demised premises.
Id.—Action for Bent—Possession of Lessee not Changed—Trespass upon Appurtenant Water Right—Damages—Rent not Extinguished.—Where it appears that the lessee sued for rent was at all times in the actual possession and occupancy of the premises and of the water rights appurtenant thereto, except that it is found that a comparatively small portion of the water was wrongfully taken with the knowledge and consent of the lessor, on or about April 1st of one year, and that the damage resulting therefrom could he measured in money was the sum of $40 only, which was deducted from the rent reserved, it is held that the act of interference amounted to no more than a mere trespass, and that there was no eviction from a substantial part of the premises that could extinguish the rent.
Id.—Consistency of Findings—Mere Passing Trespass not Inconsistent With Possession.—Since no mere passing trespass amounts to an interference with possession, the finding that the defendant had the sole and exclusive possession of the demised premises and the appurtenant water rights is not in conflict with the finding that a third party named, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, interfered with said water rights, to defendant’s detriment in a specified sum awarded to defendant, on one occasion only.
Id.—Support of Finding as to Trespass—Conflicting Evidence—Respondent not Entitled to Relief.—It is held that, although there is some evidence urged by respondent which might have sustained a finding that the third person named had the right to divert a portion of the water for use on his land during defendant’s term as lessee, yet as there is some evidence supporting the finding that he was a trespasser, and not authorized to use any part of the water, this court cannot change the finding, and that the respondent, not having appealed, is not in a position 'to ask for such relief.
HART, J.
This is an action for the recovery .of rent alleged to be due the plaintiff from the defendant under the
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terms of a certain lease executed by the plaintiff and one E. A. Kelley of a tract of land known as the “Kelley Ranch,” and situated in Lassen county.
(E. A. Kelley, subsequently to the execution of said lease, conveyed and transferred to plaintiff all his interest in the demised premises.)
The complaint prayed for judgment in the sum of $454.34, but the court, by which the action was tried, a jury having been waived by the parties, awarded judgment in the sum of $414.34.
This appeal is prosecuted by the defendant from the judgment, supported by a bill of exceptions.
By the lease the lessors demised to the defendant the land therein described, together with the appurtenances thereto, for the term of five years, commencing on the first day of March, 1908, at the yearly rental of $500 in United States gold coin, to be paid as follows: $250 on or before the first day of March, and $250 on or before the first day of October, of each and every year “during the five year term of this lease, as aforesaid.”
The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant has paid the sum of $45.66, only, on account of said rent for the year commencing on the first day of March, 1909, and that there is, therefore, a balance due and owing plaintiff from defendant on account of the rent for said year, the sum for which plaintiff prays judgment.
Among other covenants of said lease is the following: “That the said second party, paying the said rent and performing said covenants and promises, shall and may at all times peaceably have, hold and enjoy the said premises, without any manner of let, suit, trouble or hindrance of or from the said first parties or. any other person whomsoever.”
The answer admits the execution of the lease as alleged in the complaint; denies that any balance is due plaintiff from defendant on account of the rent referred to in the complaint, and then, as a special defense, and upon which a counterclaim in the sum of $717.80 is set up, the answer, in substance, alleges: That, in connection with the demised land, there are certain water rights and ditches from Susan river, which said water rights are exclusive to the use of said real property and
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